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SPAC THE DECK: WHY THE CONTROL EXERTED
BY SPAC SPONSORS SUBJECTS DE-SPAC
TRANSACTIONS TO ENTIRE FAIRNESS REVIEW
AJ Harris*
ABSTRACT
Special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs), otherwise known as
blank check companies, are corporations created to raise capital from
investors with the express purpose of using such capital to acquire an
already existing business. Much like a traditional merger, the
transaction between the SPAC and the target company (formally
called the “Initial Business Combination” or colloquially the “deSPAC transaction”) is highly scrutinized in shareholder litigation.
However, Delaware courts have not definitively established under
which standard these de-SPAC transactions should be reviewed. This
Note examines the SPAC structure, evaluates the arguments for the
respective standards, and ultimately concludes that Delaware courts
should review de-SPAC transactions under the entire fairness
standard. Further, this Note argues that SPACs can rebut the
presumption of entire fairness and earn business judgment review by
following the steps set forth in the seminal decision of Kahn v. M & F
Worldwide Corp., which have been found to be applicable to a wide
range of corporate transactions.
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INTRODUCTION
A special purpose acquisition company (“SPAC”), also known as a
blank-check company, is a corporation that raises capital with the sole
purpose of effectuating a business combination with another company.1
The initial business combination between the SPAC and the target
company is colloquially known as a de-SPAC transaction (“de-SPAC
transaction” or alternatively “Initial Business Combination”).2 But not all
SPACs lead to happy outcomes for investors,3 and shareholders have
taken to the Delaware courts to challenge the de-SPAC transaction.4
In the leading SPAC litigation, In re MultiPlan Corporation
Stockholders Litigation, the Delaware Court of Chancery determined that
entire fairness review was appropriate for the de-SPAC transaction at
issue, but the Court did not establish entire fairness as the standard over
all de-SPAC transactions.5 This Note seeks to determine whether the
SPAC structure should presumptively subject de-SPAC transactions to
entire fairness review. Part I of this Note will provide an overview of the
SPAC lifecycle and will highlight the role of the SPAC Sponsor
throughout. Part II will discuss the potential standards of review. Part III
will examine whether the individual, entity, or team that leads the SPAC
(collectively the “Sponsor”) qualifies as a controlling shareholder, and
whether the de-SPAC transaction presents an actionable conflict
subjecting the transaction to entire fairness review. Part IV will first
discuss how the dual protections established in Kahn v. M & F Worldwide
Corporation6 (“MFW”) can be readily applied to the de-SPAC transaction
to provide SPACs an applicable framework to secure business judgment
deference; and then Part IV will propose that by strictly following the

1. Ramey Layne & Brenda Lenahan, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies: An
Introduction, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 6, 2018), https://corpgov.
law.harvard.edu/2018/07/06/special-purpose-acquisition-companies-an-introduction/
[https://perma.cc/WPK8-7V7T].
2. See id.
3. See generall! Michael Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, 39 YALE J. ON
REG. 228 (2022).
4. In re Multiplan Corp. S’holders Litig., Docket No. 2021-0300 (Del. Ch. argued
Sept. 21, 2021); Delman v. GigAcquisitions3, Docket No. 2021-0679 (Del. Ch. filed Aug.
4, 2021); In re XL Fleet (Pivotal) S’holder Litig., Docket No. 2021-0808 (Del. Ch. filed
Sept. 20, 2021).
5. In re MultiPlan Corp. S’holders Litig., 268 A.3d 784, 809 (Del. Ch., 2022).
6. Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014), overruled b!
Flood v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., 195 A.3d 754 (Del. 2018).
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MFW formalities, a SPAC can earn business judgment deference at the
pleadings stage.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE SPAC LIFECYCLE
This Part will provide background on the lifecycle of a SPAC and its
typical terms. Section A will discuss the SPAC structure, particularly
focusing on its capitalization and voting rights. Section B will outline the
role of the SPAC Sponsor in the structure’s formation and registration
process. Section C will examine the de-SPAC transaction and highlight
how the SPAC’s Initial Business Combination compares to a traditional
corporate merger. And Section D will outline the incentives of Sponsor
and non-Sponsor investors to participate in a SPAC.
A. THE SPAC STRUCTURE
SPACs are newly created corporations that raise money through an
initial public offering (IPO) with the express purpose of using the funds
to acquire one or more existing businesses or assets within a defined
term.7 After raising capital and identifying a target company for the
proposed acquisition, known as the Initial Business Combination or deSPAC transaction, the SPAC puts the transaction to a vote before its
investors: they vote whether to (i) approve the merger and (ii) participate
in the merged company or redeem their shares at par plus interest.8 This
right of redemption is the defining feature of the SPAC structure. Unlike
a traditional corporate merger where shareholders may only be redeemed
via appraisal rights if they vote against the transaction, SPAC
shareholders may be redeemed irrespective of whether they vote for or

7. Interestingly, SPACs are not a new corporate structure and trace their roots to
the blank-check companies of the 1980’s. Daniel S. Riemer, Special Purpose Acquisition
Companies: SPAC and Span, or Blank Check Redu"?, 85 WASH. U.L. REV. 931, 934-43
(2007). However, they experienced a renaissance in 2020 and 2021, and SPAC IPOs rose
to a newfound level of prominence, accounting for over half the IPO issuances over the
period. Klausner et al., supra note 3, at 230 (“In both 2020 and 2021 (through November),
SPAC IPOs accounted for more than half of total IPOs, and among firms that went public
in those years, SPAC mergers accounted for roughly 22 [percent] and 34 [percent],
respectively.”).
8. See Klausner et al., supra note 3, at 230.
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against the transaction.9 This redemption mechanism distinguishes
SPACs from traditional corporations and creates distinct conflicts,
challenges, and incentives.10 But once a SPAC receives investor approval
for the transaction and combines with the target company, the merged
company operates like a traditional corporation and the vestiges of the
SPAC disappear.
SPACs are created and managed by a group of founders, known as
Sponsors, who may be associated with a private equity or hedge fund or
otherwise be an independent group of business executives, entrepreneurs,
individual investors, or the like.11 In return for its efforts organizing the
SPAC, the Sponsor earns a “promote” of 20 percent ownership in the
SPAC’s post-IPO shares.12 The “promote” is structured through a special
class of stock, commonly referred to as Founder Shares, where the
Sponsor pays a nominal amount, usually $25,000, for the shares.13 Post
IPO, Founder Shares remain a separate class of stock from that held by
the public shareholders; importantly, the Founder Shares only convert
into commonly held shares if the SPAC completes the de-SPAC
transaction.14 Such conversion typically occurs on a one-for-one basis, but
the terms may vary.15 However, if the SPAC does not complete the deSPAC transaction, the shares expire worthless.16

9. Layne & Lenahan, supra note 1 (“Under stock exchange listing rules, if a
shareholder vote is sought, only shareholders who vote against the De-SPAC transaction
are required to be offered the ability to redeem their public shares, but SPAC charter
documents typically require the offer to be made to all holders.”).
10. Due to the right of redemption, the proceeds of the SPAC IPO are placed in
escrow in a trust account. Pursuant to the SPAC’s charter, “cash in the trust can be used
only to (a) acquire a company, (b) contribute to the capital of the company formed by the
SPAC’s merger, (c) distribute to shareholders in liquidation if the SPAC fails to
consummate a merger, or (d) redeem shares.” Klausner et al., supra note 3, at 237.
11. Id. at 230.
12. Id. at 232.
13. Layne & Lenahan, supra note 1.
14. Hunter Fortney, SPAC Attack: An Examination of SPAC Director
Compensation and Its Legal Implications 3-4 (Aug. 11, 2021) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3911337 [https://perma.cc/29QJ-SVLS].
15. For example, the “exchange ratio upon which the founder shares convert to
public shares will be adjusted to gross the founder shares up to 20 [percent] of the total
founder shares and public shares and equity-linked securities outstanding.” Layne &
Lenahan, supra note 1.
16. Usha Rodrigues & Mike Stegemoller, E"it, Voice, and Reputation: The
Evolution of Spacs, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849, 894 (2013).
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In contrast, public investors are sold units through the SPAC IPO,
usually priced at $10 per unit “of one share of common stock and a
fraction of a warrant to purchase a share of common stock in the future.”17
Additionally, each unit contains the right of redemption, where
investors may elect to participate in the proposed de-SPAC transaction or
instead redeem their shares at par plus interest; the common stock and
warrant are separately tradeable, so should an investor elect to redeem,
the investor will keep the warrant originally purchased.18
Despite the availability of this option, the entire SPAC structure is
designed towards receiving approval for the proposed de-SPAC
transaction. The Sponsor and other holders of Founder Shares will
typically commit from the outset to vote their shares in favor of the deSPAC transaction.19 For example, if “at least 20 [percent] of the SPAC’s
outstanding shares will be committed to vote in favor of a transaction, []
only 37.5 [percent] of the public shares [are required] to achieve a
majority vote and approve the transaction.”20
Finally, like a traditional merger, SPACs often arrange financing in
anticipation of signing the acquisition agreement; however, SPACs
typically seek private equity financing, rather than debt.21 Private
investment in public equity (“PIPE”) commitments are commonly sought
to both finance a portion of the purchase price and to plug whatever gap
in funding may arise from the common stockholder redemptions. 22
For the purposes of this Note, the distinguishing features of the
SPAC transaction are the Founder Shares (and subsequent conversion
dynamics), the right of redemption afforded to investors, and the role of
the Sponsor throughout the SPAC lifecycle.
B. ROLE OF SPAC SPONSORS IN THE FORMATION PROCESS
SPAC Sponsors drive the formation process from incorporation
through registration. As previously mentioned, Sponsors are compensated
for their efforts in organizing the SPAC through their promote; in return,
the nominal funding plus additional investments are put towards the costs

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Layne & Lenahan, supra note 1.
Klausner et al., supra note 3, at 237.
Layne & Lenahan, supra note 1.
Id.
Id.
Klausner et al., supra note 3, at 238. See also Fortney, supra note 14, at 4.
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of setting up the SPAC, namely the legal, underwriting, and transaction
fees.23
To start, the Sponsor works with a legal advisor to incorporate and
organize the SPAC, and with underwriters to capitalize the SPAC through
an IPO.24 The SPAC must register with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and submit the necessary disclosures. 25
The Sponsor, with its advisors, creates the bylaws and charter of the
SPAC and selects its board of directors.26 To be listed on either of the
largest American stock exchanges!the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE)27 or the Nasdaq28!a majority of the directors must be
independent. Much like for a traditional corporation, SPAC directors are
selected on account of their industry expertise,29 investing experience,30

23.
24.
25.

Klausner et al., supra note 3, at 250-52.
Id.
“A SPAC will go through the typical IPO process of filing a registration
statement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), clearing SEC
comments, and undertaking a road show followed by a firm commitment underwriting.”
Layne & Lenahan, supra note 1. See also Klausner et al., supra note 3, at 236-39.
26. Layne & Lenahan, supra note 1.
27. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL: SECTION 303A
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, https://www.
nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/regulation/nyse/FAQ_NYSE_Listed_Company_Manual_Sec
tion_303A_7_28_2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/UG47-R5GV] (“Listed companies must
have a majority of independent directors.”).
28. NASDAQ, 5600 Corporate Governance Requirements: Rule 5605(b)(1),
https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/rulebook/nasdaq/rules/nasdaq-5600-series
[https://perma.cc/E5DZ-92S8] (“A majority of the board of directors must be comprised
of Independent Directors . . . .”).
29. For example, one director nominee in a Technology, Media, and
Telecommunications (TMT) focused SPAC was a “senior technologist and entrepreneur
with more than 25 years of experience in Radio-Frequency and Optical Interconnect
Systems and Components and Radio-Frequency Integrated Circuit Semiconductor
technologies.” GigCapital3, Inc., Amendment No. 4 to Registration Statement (Form S!
1/A) 102 (Apr. 29, 2020) [hereinafter GigCapital3, Inc. Registration Statement].
30. Four of the five director nominees in Churchill Capital Corp III served in
leadership roles in the investment business (Jeremy Abson, Glenn August, Mark Klein,
and Malcolm McDermid). Churchill Cap. Corp III, Amendment No. 3 to Registration
Statement (Form S!1/A) 110-11 (Feb. 13, 2020) [hereinafter Churchill Cap. Corp III
Registration Statement].
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applicable executive experience,31 or otherwise useful backgrounds.32
And the Sponsor weighs such criteria in selecting the initial directors for
the SPAC.
That said, unlike a traditional corporation where directors are often
limited in the number of outside boards they may sit on,33 SPAC directors
often serve on multiple boards of SPACs backed by the same Sponsor.34
SPAC directorships also vary from traditional corporate directorships in
both the size and terms of compensation.35 Directors are generally
compensated through Founder Shares, either granted directly or through
economic interests in the SPAC Sponsor itself.36 As a result, most SPAC
registration statements explicitly disclose that “none of [the] executive
officers, directors or director nominees have received any cash
compensation for services rendered.”37
31. For example, in the aforementioned TMT-focused SPAC, one director nominee
(John Mikulsky) had extensive experience in leadership roles in the semiconductor space,
and another director nominee (Dr. Raluca Dinu) had similar extensive experience in the
optics industry. See GigCapital3, Inc. Registration Statement, supra note 29, at 101-02.
32. Id. at 101 (“Mr. Miotto is a financial consultant and a [former] assurance partner
. . . deemed to be a[n] "audit committee financial expert’ under SEC rules.”).
33. Kosmas Papadopoulos, Director Overboarding: Global Trends, Definitions, and
Impact, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 2 (Aug. 5, 2019), https://corpgov.law.
harvard.edu/2019/08/05/director-overboarding-global-trends-definitions-and-impact/
[https://perma.cc/UCH5-UW5K] (“A growing number of public companies appear to
address overboarding, often by placing limitations on the number of outside boards that
a CEO and directors may serve on, and even putting additional limits on audit committee
members as well.”).
34. See Fortney, supra note 14, at 11 (“[C]ertain directors may participate in multiple
SPACs of the same Sponsor.”). In Churchill Capital Corp III, each of the director
nominees simultaneously served as a director in Churchill Capital Corp II, and two of the
director nominees had previously served as a director in Churchill Capital Corp#both
SPACs were backed by the Sponsor of Churchill Capital Corp III. See Churchill Cap.
Corp III Registration Statement, supra note 30, at 110-11.
35. See Fortney, supra note 14, at 5 (“The payout structure of SPAC Director
compensation is materially different than director compensation at most publicly traded
companies.”).
36. See id. at 7 (citing Golden Falcon Acquisition Corp., Prospectus (424B4) 136
(Dec. 21, 2020)). See also GigCapital3, Inc. Registration Statement, supra note 29, at 75
(“[Directors have] a financial and voting interest in [the] Sponsor that entitles [each of
them] to participate in any economic return that the Sponsor receives for its investment
in the Company in accordance with terms negotiated with the other holders of financial
and voting interests in [the] Sponsor.”).
37. Fortney, supra note 14, at 6-7 (citing Golden Falcon Acquisition Corp.,
Prospectus (424B4) 136 (Dec. 21, 2020)). See also Churchill Cap. Corp III Registration
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Upon completing the formation process, the SPAC is capitalized and
its directors may proceed to select a target company to merge with to
complete the Initial Business Combination.
C. DE-SPAC TRANSACTIONS
Procedurally, de-SPAC transactions operate similarly to public
company mergers: a target company is identified, merger discussions
begin, a definitive agreement is signed, and the transaction is then voted
upon by the shareholders.38 Like a traditional public company merger
vote, a SPAC must file a proxy statement and hold a shareholder meeting
for the vote.39 However, the redemption right held by common
stockholders in a SPAC presents a wrinkle in shareholder voting: the
shareholders vote on (i) whether to approve the merger (#for,$ #against,$
or #abstain$) and (ii) whether to participate in the transaction or to
redeem their shares.40 Common stockholders who voted to redeem will be
paid $10.00 per share plus interest in cash from the trust account.41 And
if a SPAC receives the necessary votes to approve the transaction, the
SPAC may proceed forward to close the de-SPAC transaction and
Sponsors can look to PIPE financing #to replace funds lost to redemptions
and thereby reduce dilution.$42
D. INCENTIVES TO PARTICIPATE IN A SPAC
SPACs offer attractive economics and potential upside for each type
of investor. For the Sponsor, Founder Shares provide a mouth-watering
opportunity: for just $25,000,43 Sponsors purchase Founder Shares that
Statement, supra note 30, at 112 (“None of [the] officers or directors have received any
compensation for services rendered to [the SPAC] . . . .”).
38. Layne & Lenahan, supra note 1.
39. Fortney, supra note 14, at 4.
40. Layne & Lenahan, supra note 1.
41. Klausner et al., supra note 3, at 237.
42. Id. at 253.
43. While sponsors acquire the Founder Shares for a nominal amount, such as the
$25,000 referenced, sponsors provide additional financing by purchasing warrants “equal
to the 2.0 [percent] upfront underwriting discount of the IPO . . . plus funds to cover the
offering expenses and expenses to find a target, with the aggregate price of the purchased
warrants in most recent deals hovering between 2.3 [percent] to 3.0 [percent] of the gross
IPO proceeds.” Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP, A SPAC Primer, M&A Monitor
2 (Mar. 01, 2021), https://www.kramerlevin.com/en/perspectives-search/a-spac-primer.
html [https://perma.cc/5PXQ-8MZB].
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may ultimately convert into 20 percent ownership of the SPAC,
promising potential profits of tens,44 if not hundreds of millions of
dollars.45 For retail investors, SPAC common stock offers “a chance to
participate in the growth of promising companies.”46 According to
Chamath Palihapitiya, a prominent SPAC Sponsor, a SPAC
“democratizes access to high-growth companies”47 and “can give a large
swath of investors access to the kind of high-growth companies the wellconnected have been making billions of dollars off of for years.”48 There
are also benefits for non-Sponsor, non-retail investors, because although
participating through common stock is an option, private placements
often offer the preferred avenue to participate meaningfully in the SPAC
and to share in the upside and attractive economics of the structure.49

44. The Plaintiffs in another ongoing Delaware litigation case highlighted in their
Complaint that the respective de-SPAC “merger was a financial windfall for Katz, the
Sponsor, inside director Dinu, and the purportedly independent directors. Even though
Gig3’s stock price had fallen to $7.82 per share on May 6, 2021 (the day the merger was
completed), Katz and the Sponsor reaped a return of approximately $39 million from the
Merger.” Complaint at 10, Delman v. GigAcquisitions3, No. 2021-0679 (Del. Ch. filed
Aug. 4, 2021).
45. Complaint, In re Multiplan Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 2021-0300 (Del. Ch. filed
Apr. 9, 2021). As alleged in the Multiplan litigation, “the founder shares, held mainly by
[the Sponsor] but still giving the Board members multi-million-dollar windfalls, cost [the
Sponsor] just $25,000 yet were worth !"e# $300 $i""i!% upon the Merger’s closing,
representing a personal return on investment of 1,219,900 [&e#ce%'].” Id. at 4-5 (emphasis
in original).
46. Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Fordham
Journal of Corporate and Financial Law Symposium: Here to Stay: Wrestling with the
Future of the Quickly Maturing SPAC Market (Oct. 22, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/peirce-remarks-fordham-journal-102221 [https://perma.cc/48CB-G7SU].
47. Charles Duhigg, The Pied Piper of SPACs, NEW YORKER (June 7, 2021), https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/06/07/the-pied-piper-of-spacs [https://perma.cc/
35DV-Q6BL].
48. Chamath Palihapitiya, SPACs Need More Regulation and Oversight,
BLOOMBERG (May 27, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-05-27/
spacs-can-take-away-the-insiders-advantage-in-ipos-and-markets [https://perma.cc/N7
8N-TSJJ].
49. Although the terms of private placements vary with each SPAC, private
placements typically offer an opportunity to purchase the underlying security at a
discount (convertible notes, common stock, warrants, etc.). See Churchill Cap. Corp III,
Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 1 (Sept. 18, 2020) (“The Common PIPE
Investment is subject to an original issue discount (payable in additional shares of
Churchill’s Class A common stock) of 1 [percent] for subscriptions of $250,000,000 or
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Much like other investors in the SPAC, Sponsors have a common
interest in maximizing the value of their shares. But at the outset of the
SPAC lifecycle, Sponsors hold Founder Shares while other stockholders
hold common shares.50 Structurally, the interests of common stockholders
and the Sponsors diverge around the event that triggers the conversion of
Founder Shares to common stock: the de-SPAC transaction.51 Sponsors
maximize the value of their Founder Shares through the consummation of
the de-SPAC transaction: if the transaction does not happen, their Founder
Shares expire, worthless.52 Theoretically, Sponsors are incentivized to
seek a combination with an! target company over none at all.53 But once
the de-SPAC transaction closes, and the Sponsor’s shares convert from
Founder Shares to common stock, the interests of the Sponsor and other
stockholders realign; as holders of the same class of common stock,54 they
are all similarly motivated to maximize the value of the commonly held
shares. But maximizing the value of the common shares is only achieved
through combining with the right company. This divergence of interests
around the de-SPAC transaction creates an inherent conflict, which is
heightened as the completion window draws to a close.55

less and 2.5 [percent] for subscriptions of more than $250,000,000 . . . .”) [hereinafter
Churchill Cap. Corp III, Definitive Proxy Statement].
50. GigCapital 3, Inc. Registration Statement, supra note 29, at 112,115 (disclosing
that the Sponsor only holds founder shares and no common stock prior to the offering).
51. Churchill Cap. Corp III Registration Statement, supra note 30, at 16, 129, F-14
(“The shares of Class B common stock will automatically convert into shares of Class A
common stock at the time of a Business Combination on a one-for-one basis, subject to
adjustment.”).
52. Id. at 60 (“The founder shares will be worthless if we do not complete an initial
business combination.”).
53. Peirce, supra note 46 (“What is good for the SPAC [S]ponsor may not be good
for the SPAC investors.”).
54. Churchill Cap. Corp III, Definitive Proxy Statement, supra note 49, at 16, 129,
F-12 (“The Founder Shares will automatically convert into shares of Class A common
stock upon consummation of a Business Combination on a one-for-one basis, subject to
certain adjustments.”).
55. Id. at 1 (defining “completion window” as the 24-month period following the
completion of the registration in which the Sponsor must complete the Initial Business
Combination, otherwise the Sponsor must redeem all the Class A common stock at par
price and the Founder Shares of Class B common stock expire worthless).
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR DE-SPAC TRANSACTIONS
As SPAC issuance continues to rise, the legal community has been
busy eagerly predicting and preparing for a wave of SPAC litigation to
follow.56 Securities class actions against SPAC-related companies have
increased from two in 2019, to five in 2020, to twenty-six in 2021.57
SPAC shareholder lawsuits typically “challenge the de-SPAC
transaction” or allege “fiduciary duty and securities law claims in
connection with stock drops or other adverse events after the de-SPAC
transaction.”58 Although these lawsuits resemble claims brought against a
traditional public company, the SPAC’s unique structure fosters new
challenges. Plaintiffs argue that the structure creates conflicts of interest,
misalignment between Sponsor, director, and shareholder interests, and
improperly incentivizes the completion of a deal at the shareholders’
expense.59 This Note focuses on state law claims#specifically the

56. Priya Cherian Huskins, Wh! More SPACs Could Lead to More Litigation
(and How to Prepare), ABA (June 25, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
business_law/publications/blt/2020/07/spacs-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/CS2V-25WT];
Jonathan Gordon & Brendan F. Quigley, SPACs to the Future: What T!pes of Litigation
Ma! Arise for SPACs and SPAC Targets?, BAKER BOTTS: THOUGHT LEADERSHIP (Nov.
2, 2020), https://www.bakerbotts.com/thought-leadership/publications/2020/november/
spacs-to-the-future-what-types-of-litigation-may-arise-for-spacs-and-spac-targets
[https://perma.cc/ZDQ9-DQQM].
57. Sierra Jackson, SPACs Under the Microscope as Lawsuits Mount, REUTERS
(Nov. 1, 2021), www.reuters.com/legal/transactional/spacs-under-microscope-lawsuitsmount-2021-11-01/ [https://perma.cc/9X9L-CKRX].

Securities class actions against SPAC-related companies have been on
the rise since 2019, when there were just two such lawsuits, according
to a report from insurance brokerage Woodruff Sawyer. From January
2021 through October 29, 26 securities class actions were filed against
SPAC-related companies, a 420 [percent] jump from 2020 when only
five suits were brought, according to the data.
Id.

58. What SPAC Sponsors, Directors and Officers Can Do to Mitigate Their
Litigation E"posure, PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP (Mar. 17,
2021), https://www.paulweiss.com/practices/litigation/securities-litigation/publications/
what-spac-sponsors-directors-and-officers-can-do-to-mitigate-their-litigationexposure?id=39540 [https://perma.cc/3GWN-P9PW].
59. See id.; LITIGATION RISK IN THE SPAC WORLD, QUINN EMANUEL
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challenges to de-SPAC transactions of Delaware corporations#and seeks
to determine what standard of review should be applied to such de-SPAC
transactions.
A. BUSINESS JUDGMENT REVIEW
“Delaware’s default standard of review is the business judgment
rule, a principle of non-review that "reflects and promotes the role of the
board of directors as the proper body to manage the business and affairs
of the corporation.’”60 Business judgment review presumes that directors
were informed, acted in good faith, and honestly believed that their
actions were in the company’s best interests.61 Business judgment rule is
highly deferential: “[u]nless one of its elements is rebutted, "the court
merely looks to see whether the business decision made was rational in
the sense of being one logical approach to advancing the corporation’s
objectives.’”62 As a result, corporate defendants strive to obtain business
judgment review since a board’s decision will likely be upheld when such
presumptions are applicable.63
B. ENTIRE FAIRNESS
However, under Delaware law, it is well established that transactions
between a corporation and a controlling stockholder are to be treated with
suspicion.64 These controller transactions are often reviewed under the
URQUHART & SULLIVAN 4 (2020), https://www.quinnemanuel.com/media/l00ldp5d
/client-alert-litigation-risk-in-the-spac-world.pdf [https://perma.cc/3J76-9YP5].
60. Firefighters’ Pension Sys. of Kansas City, Missouri Tr. v. Presidio, Inc., 251
A.3d 212, 249 (Del. Ch. 2021) (quoting In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig. (Trados I), 2009
WL 2225958, at *6 (Del. Ch. 2009)).
61. Quadrant Structured Prods. Co. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 183 (Del. Ch. 2014)
(quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)) (“The rule presumes that "in
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company.’”).
62. Firefighters% Pension S!s., 251 A.3d at 249 (quoting In re Dollar Thrifty
S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 598 (Del. Ch. 2010) (Strine, V.C.)).
63. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006) (quoting
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)) (“[W]here business
judgment presumptions are applicable, the board’s decision will be upheld unless it
cannot be "attributed to any rational business purpose.’”).
64. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Wa!: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of
the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 678 (2005)

576

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXVII

entire fairness standard, as “[a] controlling stockholder occupies a
uniquely advantageous position for extracting differential benefits from
the corporation at the expense of minority stockholders.”65 While the
presence of a controlling stockholder does not subject ever! controller
transaction to entire fairness, transactions where the controller is
conflicted do require entire fairness review.66 At issue in the de-SPAC
transaction is whether SPAC Sponsors can be considered conflicted
controllers under Delaware law. Specifically, the questions to be
determined are (1) whether the Sponsor exerts sufficient control over the
SPAC to be considered a controlling shareholder, and (2) whether the
Sponsor’s holdings are structured in a manner that creates a conflicted
transaction. If both questions are answered in the affirmative, then
Sponsors will be considered conflicted controllers and the de-SPAC
transaction will be subjected to entire fairness review.
1. Transactions Involving Controlling Shareholders Are Treated with
Suspicion
In determining whether a stockholder qualifies as a controller, the
analysis “must take into account whether the stockholder, as a practical
matter, possesses a combination of stock voting power and managerial
authority that enables him to control the corporation, if he so wishes.”67
“While every stockholder with majority voting control is a controller, not
every controller is a majority stockholder.”68 A stockholder who owns less
(“Delaware is more suspicious when the fiduciary who is interested is a controlling
stockholder.”). See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (establishing
entire fairness as the standard of review for transactions where a corporation’s fiduciaries
are conflicted); Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994) (applying
entire fairness review to a cash-out merger by a controlling shareholder); Tornetta v.
Musk, 250 A.3d 793 (Del. Ch. 2019) (extending entire fairness review to an incentivebased compensation agreement between a corporation and its Chairman, CEO, and
alleged controlling shareholder).
65. In re Ezcorp Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig., 2016 WL 301245, at
*11 (Del. Ch. 2016) (paraphrasing Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Wa!: How We Do
Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 673, 678 (2005)).
66. In re Crimson Expl. Inc. S’holders Litig., 2014 WL 5449419, at *12 (Del. Ch.
2014).
67. In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 553 (Del. Ch. 2003).
68. In re Tesla Motors, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 12711, 2020 WL 553902, at *4 n.24
(Del. Ch. 2020) (citing Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys. Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113-14 (Del.
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than 50 percent of the corporation’s outstanding stock, in other words a
minority blockholder, “is not considered to be a controlling stockholder
unless it exercises "such formidable voting and managerial power that [it],
as a practical matter, [is] no differently situated than if [it] had majority
voting control.’”69 Such control may exist generally or in regards to a
challenged transaction.70 In determining whether such control exists, “the
focus of the [controller] inquiry [is] on the de facto power of a significant
(but less than majority) shareholder, which, when coupled with other
factors, gives that shareholder the ability to dominate the corporate
decision-making process.”71
Controller inquiries therefore start by examining the blockholder’s
voting power, but “there is no absolute percentage of voting power that is
required in order for there to be a finding that a controlling stockholder
exists.”72 The court then looks to “other factors,”73 which have included
“managerial supremacy,”74 “the minority blockholder’s role as a
company’s "hands-on’ CEO and "inspirational force’ who was "involved
in all aspects of the company’s business,’”75 and even where a company’s
public statements disclosed that the minority blockholder was “"able to
exercise significant influence over [the] company’ and that a loss of the
blockholder "would have a material adverse effect on [its] business and
1994) (“[A] shareholder owes a fiduciary duty only if it owns a majority interest in or
exercises control over the business affairs of a corporation.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
69. In re Morton’s Rest. Grp. S’holders Litig., 74 A.3d 656, 665 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(quoting In re PNB Holdings Co. S’holders Litig., 2006 WL 2403999, at *9 (Del. Ch.
2006)). See also In re Tesla Motors, 2020 WL 553902, at *4 (quoting Corwin v. KKR
Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 307 (Del. 2015)) (“A minority blockholder can, as a
matter of law, be a controlling stockholder through "a combination of potent voting power
and management control such that the stockholder could be deemed to have effective
control of the board without actually owning a majority of stock.’”).
70. In re Tesla Motors, 2020 WL 553902, at *4 (citing Carsanaro v. Bloodhound
Techs., Inc., 65 A.3d 618, 659 (Del. Ch. 2013) (quoting Williamson v. Cox Commc’ns
Inc., 2006 WL 1586375, at *4 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“The requisite degree of control can be
shown to exist generally or "with regard to the particular transaction that is being
challenged.’”)).
71. Id. at *4 (quoting Superior Vision Servs., Inc. v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co., 2006
WL 2521426, at *4 (Del. Ch. 2006)) (emphasis added).
72. Id. (citing In re PNB Holdings Co. S’holders Litig., 2006 WL 2403999, at *9
(Del. Ch. 2006)).
73. Id. (quoting In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 553 (Del. Ch.
2003)).
74. Id.
75. Id.
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operations.’”76 Ultimately, the controller analysis is a fact-specific
inquiry: whether a minority blockholder qualifies as a controller depends
on the unique circumstances of the corporation or transaction.
In 2003, then-Vice Chancellor Leo E. Strine, Jr. set the “benchmark
for the minimum degree of managerial clout needed to meet the actual
control test where the alleged controller’s holdings are well below 50
[percent] of a company’s outstanding shares.”77 In In re C!sive, Inc.
Shareholders Litigation, the court determined that a company’s founder
(who also served as its Chairman and CEO) only “controlled 36 [percent]
of the [outstanding] shares before options”78 between himself and “his
close managerial-subordinate and family member-subordinates”79 but
nevertheless was a controlling shareholder. The court reasoned that the
blockholder held “a large enough block of stock to be the dominant force
in any contested [company] election . . . especially so when one considers
the practical realities of his voting power,” which included the votes of
his subordinates and family members.80 In 2013, then-Chancellor Strine
reflected on his C!sive decision, noting that “this court made, perhaps, its
most aggressive finding that a minority blockholder was a controlling
stockholder” but ultimately defended the holding, reasoning that:
[T]he blockholder not only held 35 [percent] of the company’s stock,
but he was the company’s visionary founder, CEO, and chairman . . .
[and] exercised more power than a typical CEO because he had placed
“two of his close family members in executive positions at the
company,” which gave the blockholder influence over even “the
ordinary managerial operations of the company.”81

76. Id. (quoting In re Zhongpin Inc. S’holders Litig., No. CV 7393-VCN, 2014 WL
6735457, at *7 (Del. Ch. 2014) (rev%d on other grounds, In re Cornerstone Therapeutics
Inc. S’holder Litig., 115 A.3d 1173 (Del. 2015))).
77. Larkin v. Shah, 2016 WL 4485447, at *14 (Del. Ch. 2016).
78. In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 535 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“When
considering options, this group ! taken together ! controlled about 40 [percent] of the
voting equity.”).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 551-52.
81. In re Morton’s Rest. Grp. S’holders Litig., 74 A.3d 656, 665-66 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(quoting C!sive, 836 A.2d at 551-52).
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C!sive remains a landmark ruling and, as noted in a 2016 decision,
the Court of Chancery has often “invoked the facts of [C!sive] as a
benchmark” for the controller inquiry.82
Since C!sive, Delaware “courts have been reluctant to apply the label
of controlling stockholder#potentially triggering fiduciary duties#to
large, but minority, blockholders.”83 In 2014, the Court of Chancery in In
re Crimson E"ploration Inc. Stockholder Litigation presented a detailed
analysis of previous cases84 where “the parties disputed whether a nonmajority stockholder satisfied this actual control test.”85 The Crimson
analysis highlighted that “[a]bsent a significant showing such as was
made” in C!sive, Delaware courts are “reluctant” to find the existence of
a controlling stockholder. 86 However, that is not to say the court will
never find a minority blockholder to be a controlling shareholder. The
Crimson analysis merely highlights that there is not a “linear, slidingscale approach whereby a larger share percentage makes it substantially
more likely that the court will find the stockholder was a controlling
stockholder.” 87
For SPACs, where Sponsor shares ultimately convert into 20 percent
of the outstanding stock, such a small block, paired with other realities of
the structure, may be enough. In another 2014 decision, In re Zhongpin
Inc. Stockholders Litigation, the Court of Chancery found a complaint
sufficiently plead that a company’s “founder, Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer and [its] largest shareholder” who “only owned 17.3
[percent]”88 of the outstanding stock, qualified as a controlling

82. Larkin v. Shah, 2016 WL 4485447, at *14 (Del. Ch. 2016) (citing Morton%s Rest.
Grp., 74 A.3d at 665 (“More than once this court has invoked the facts of In re C!sive,
Inc. Shareholders Litigation as a benchmark for the minimum degree of managerial clout
needed to meet the actual control test where the alleged controller’s holdings are well
below 50 [percent] of a company’s outstanding shares.”)); In re KKR Financial Holdings
LLC S’holder Litig., 101 A.3d 980, 991 (Del. Ch. 2014) (examining the facts in C!sive
and its progeny to highlight the evolution of the controller standard). Cf. In re Crimson
Expl. Inc. S’holders Litig., 2014 WL 5449419, at *11 (Del. Ch. 2014) (using C!sive’s
facts to illustrate the sort of extreme showing needed to earn the title of controller). See
also In re PNB Holdings Co. S’holders Litig., 2006 WL 2403999, at *10 (Del. Ch. 2006).
83. In re Crimson, 2014 WL 5449419, at *12.
84. Id. at *10-12.
85. Id.
86. Id. at *12.
87. See id. at *10-12.
88. In re Zhongpin Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 7393, 2014 WL 6735457, at *7 (Del.
Ch. 2014), rev%d on other grounds, In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc., S’holder Litig.,
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shareholder. Importantly, the company’s 10-K explicitly stated that (i) he
maintained “significant influence over [company] management and
affairs,” (ii) he was “substantially” relied upon to manage company
operations, and (iii) his loss would have a “material adverse effect” on the
company’s “business and operations.”89 In 2018, the Court of Chancery
found it “reasonably conceivable” that Elon Musk, a “22.1 [percent]
stockholder”90 in Tesla Motors and, at the time, its Chairman and CEO,
could be considered a controlling stockholder on account of his “voting
influence, his domination of the Board[,] . . . his extraordinary influence
within the Company generally, the Board level conflicts that diminished
the Board’s resistance to Musk’s influence, and the Company’s and
Musk’s own acknowledgements of his outsized influence.”91 Again, while
voting share is an important consideration, “the determinative factor in
[the] controlling stockholder jurisprudence” is and remains “the "ability’
to control, rather than the actual exercise of control. . . .”92
2. Conflicted Controller Transactions Require Entire Fairness
“Entire fairness is not triggered solely because a company has a
controlling stockholder. The controller also must engage in a conflicted
transaction.”93 “Under current law, the entire fairness framework governs
any transaction between a controller and the controlled corporation in
which the controller receives a non-ratable benefit.”94 Conflicted
controller transactions “fall into one of two categories: (a) transactions
where the controller stands on both sides; and (b) transactions where the
controller competes with the common stockholders for consideration.”95
115 A.3d 1173 (Del. 2015) (quoting Zhongpin’s Annual Report on Form 10!K, filed on
March 18, 2013).
89. Id. at *6-8 (quoting Zhongpin’s Annual Report on Form 10!K, filed on March
18, 2013).
90. In re Tesla Motors, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 12711, 2018 WL 1560293, at *4
(Del. Ch. 2018).
91. Id. at *19.
92. In re Tesla Motors, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 12711, 2020 WL 553902, at *5 (Del.
Ch. 2020) (quoting Superior Vision Servs. v. ReliaStar Life Ins., 2006 WL 2521426, at
*4 (Del. Ch. 2006)).
93. In re Crimson Expl. Inc. S’holders Litig., 2014 WL 5449419, at *12 (Del. Ch.
2014).
94. In re Ezcorp Inc. Consulting Agreement Deriv. Litig., No. 9962, 2016 WL
301245, at *11 (Del. Ch. 2016).
95. In re Crimson, 2014 WL 5449419, at *12.
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These “transactions where the controller competes with the common
stockholders for consideration” are “situations where the controller does
not stand on both sides of the transaction, but nonetheless receives
different consideration or derives some unique benefit from the
transaction not shared with the common stockholders.” 96 Generally, these
competing-for-consideration transactions can be thought of as cases of (1)
disparate consideration, (2) differential consideration, or (3) unique
benefits.97 Much like the controller analysis, the conflicted transaction
analysis is a fact-specific inquiry that considers both the form and
substance of the transaction at issue.
“Delaware courts have applied the entire fairness framework to a
variety of transactions in which controlling stockholders have received
non-ratable benefits. . . .”98 Specifically, “Delaware decisions have
applied the entire fairness framework to compensation arrangements,
consulting agreements, services agreements, and similar transactions
between a controller or its affiliate and the controlled entity.”99 Such
examples are clear instances where a controller stands on both sides of a
transaction.
Less clear are instances where a “transaction appear[s] superficially
to treat all stockholders equally” but practically provides a non-ratable

96.
97.

Id.
In a 2021 decision, Vice Chancellor Slights highlighted the types of one-sided
controller transactions which create an actionable conflict:
This court has identified three examples where a controller might
compete with the minority in a manner that creates a legally
cognizable conflict: “(1) where the controller receives greater
monetary consideration for its shares than the minority stockholders;
(2) where the controller takes a different form of consideration than
the minority stockholders; and (3) where the controller gets a "unique
benefit’ by extracting something uniquely valuable to the controller,
even if the controller nominally receives the same consideration as all
other stockholders.”
Flannery v. Genomic Health, Inc., No. 2020-0492, 2021 WL 3615540, at *17 (Del. Ch.
2021) (quoting IRA Tr. FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane, 2017 WL 7053964, at *6 (Del.
Ch. 2017)). The 2021 decision builds upon a 2014 decision, in which the Court
categorized such transactions as (1) “disparate consideration” cases, (2) “continuing
stake” cases, and (3) “unique benefit” cases. In re Crimson, 2014 WL 5449419 at *14.
98. In re E&corp, 2016 WL 301245, at *13.
99. See id. at *15.
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benefit to the controller.100 The court examined this theory of non-ratable
benefits in a recent 2021 decision In re CBS Corp. Stockholder Class
Action & Derivative Litigation, highlighting the previous decision in IRA
Trust FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane to be “instructive” in the non-ratable
benefits analysis.101 In IRA Trust, the court “found it reasonably
conceivable that a non-ratable benefit was extracted” in a recapitalization
that “appeared superficially to treat all stockholders equally” but was
allegedly “motivated to allow the controller to perpetuate its control in
future transactions.”102 In In re CBS Corp., plaintiffs alleged that the
controlling shareholder engineered a merger to bail out her holding
company’s investment in the target company, which would in turn make
the holding company a more attractive prospect for a future sale.103 The
Court similarly looked past the superficial appearance of the challenged
transaction and found such particularly pled allegations created a
reasonable inference of a non-ratable benefit.104
3. Entire Fairness Ma! be Required for Additional Transaction
Specific Reasons
Beyond the Sponsor’s status as a conflicted controller, entire fairness
review may be required for the de-SPAC transaction where (1) directors
are interested in the transaction or (2) they are not sufficiently
independent due to their outstanding personal or working relationships
with the Sponsor.
a. Approval by Interested Directors Requires Entire Fairness Review
When “evidence in the record suggests that a majority of the board
of directors were interested in the transaction,” an entire fairness analysis
is required.105 “A director is interested in a transaction if "he or she will
receive a personal financial benefit from a transaction that is not equally
100. In re CBS Corp. Stockholder Class Action & Derivative Litig., 2021 WL
268779, at *36 (Del. Ch. 2021), as corrected (Feb. 4, 2021).
101. Id. (citing IRA Tr. FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane, No. 12742, 2017 WL 7053964
(Del. Ch. 2017)).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. In re Tele-Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A.16470, 2005 WL
3642727, at *8 (Del. Ch. 2005).
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shared by the stockholders.’”106 “Directors are "self-interested’ when they
appear on "both sides of a transaction’ or expect to "derive any [material]
personal financial benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing.’”107 An
incidental interest may be permitted, but a substantial interest is
disqualifying.108 Directors are afforded a presumption of disinterest and
independence and shareholder-plaintiffs carry the burden of
demonstrating that directors’ self-interest materially affected their
independence.109 To rebut this presumption, “the benefit received by the
director and not shared with stockholders must be "of a sufficiently
material importance, in the context of the director’s economic
circumstances, as to have made it improbable that the director could
perform her fiduciary duties . . . without being influenced by her
overriding personal interest . . . .’”110 Such determinations are factspecific, driven by the particular circumstances of both the transaction
and the director’s personal situation.111
b. Approval by Directors Who Lack Independence Requires
Entire Fairness Review
“Independence means that a director’s decision is based on the
corporate merits of the subject before the board rather than extraneous
considerations or influences.”112 Directors “lack independence where they

106. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 1512, 2009 WL 2225958, at *6 (Del. Ch.
2009) (quoting Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993)).
107. Calesa Assocs., L.P. v. Am. Cap., No. 10557, 2016 WL 770251, at *11 (Del. Ch.
2016) (citing Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 23 (Del. Ch. 2002) (alterations in original)).
108. In re Tele-Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. CIV.A. 16470, 2005 WL
3642727, at *8 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2005) (quoting Cinerama v. Technicolor, 663 A.2d
1156, 1169 (Del. 1995) (“"[T]o be disqualifying, the nature of the director interest must
be substantial,’ not merely "incidental.’”)).
109. Id. (citing Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 363 (Del. 1993) (“In
order to rebut the presumption of director disinterestedness and independence, a
stockholder must show that the directors’ self-interest materially affected their
independence.”)).
110. In re Trados, 2009 WL 2225958, at *6 (quoting In re Gen. Motors Class H
S’holders Litig., 734 A.2d 611, 617 (Del. Ch. 1999) (alterations in original)).
111. In re CBS Corp. S’holder Class Action & Derivative Litig., No. 2020-0111-JRS,
2021 WL 268779, at *29 (Del. Ch. Jan. 27, 2021), as corrected (Feb. 4, 2021) (“As
commentators have noted, Delaware’s independence analysis is context-specific and factintensive.”) (citing Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishi&ation of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L.
447, 470-76 (2008)).
112. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984).
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were "beholden’ to . . . or so under [the controller’s] influence that their
discretion would be sterilized.’”113 Moreover, “it is not enough to charge
that a director was nominated by or elected at the behest of those
controlling the outcome of a corporate election. That is the usual way a
person becomes a corporate director.”114 Instead, the focus is on “the care,
attention and sense of individual responsibility to the performance of” the
director’s duties, which “generally touches on independence.”115 To
succeed, “a plaintiff must allege a "constellation of facts that, taken
together, create a reasonable doubt about [the director]’s ability to
objectively’” exercise her discretion in light of personal or business
relationships with the party in question.116
As previously described in Section I.B, to secure a listing on either
of America’s largest stock exchanges, a SPAC’s board of directors must
be organized to have a majority of independent directors.117 However, the
independence determinations of an exchange do not replace the court’s
independence analysis.118 A director who qualifies as independent under
either listing standard may not qualify as independent under Delaware
law.119 That said, “"[t]he fact that a director qualifies as independent for
113. Calesa Assocs., L.P., 2016 WL 770251, at *11 (alterations in original); In re
BGC Partners, Inc. Deriv. Litig., No. 2018-0722, 2021 WL 4271788, at *6 (Del. Ch.
2021) (quoting Del. Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund v. Sanchez, 124 A.3d 1017, 1023 n.25 (Del.
2015) (“A director "subject to the interested party’s dominion or beholden to that
interested party’ lacks independence.”)).
114. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816.
115. Id.
116. In re BGC Partners, Inc., 2019 WL 4745121, at *9 (Del. Ch. 2019) (quoting In
re Oracle Corp. Deriv. Litig., No. 2017-0337, 2018 WL 1381331, at *18 (Del. Ch. 2018)
(alterations in original)); Gail Weinstein et al., Conflicted Controllers, the #800-Pound
Gorillas$: Part II'BGC, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 2 (Nov. 7, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/11/07/conflicted-controllers-the-800-poundgorillas-part-ii-bgc/ [https://perma.cc/ML8K-GC9G] (“BGC underscores that the
evaluation must be based on "the constellation of facts,’ considered "in totality,’ relating
to the director’s business and personal relationships with the controller or other interested
party.”).
117. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
118. Klein v. H.I.G. Cap., L.L.C., No. 2017-0862, 2018 WL 6719717, at *11 (Del.
Ch. 2018) (“It is true, as defendants point out, that exchange listing rules do "not operate
as a surrogate for[] this Court’s analysis of independence under Delaware law . . . .’”
(alterations in original)).
119. As Chief Justice Strine explained in Sand!s v. Pincus, “the Delaware
independence standard is context specific and does not perfectly marry with the standards
of the stock exchange in all cases, but the criteria NASDAQ has articulated as bearing on
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purposes of a governing listing standard is therefore a helpful fact which,
all else equal, makes it more likely that the director is independent for
purposes of Delaware law’ and that the "opposite is likewise true.’”120
Particular attention should be paid to whether a SPAC director is
sufficiently independent to vote against consummating the de-SPAC
transaction. Business, as well as personal relationships, can threaten such
independence. In Marchand v. Barnhill, for example, the Court
determined that “very warm and thick personal ties of respect, loyalty,
and affection”121 between a company’s director and the family of the
company’s current CEO created a reasonable doubt that the director could
“impartially or objectively assess whether to bring a lawsuit against” the
CEO.122 There, the director was a recently retired executive who had
worked at the company for 28 years, and the complaint alleged that the
CEO’s family not only supported the director’s career, but it also led a
campaign to raise money and name a building in the director’s honor at
the local university.123 Such “deep business and personal ties . . . raise a
reasonable doubt” over a director’s independence.124 In a SPAC, the
directors are not faced with the question of bringing a lawsuit against the
CEO; instead, the directors must evaluate the terms of the proposed Initial
Business Combination and determine whether to approve the transaction.
Thus, the question raised in the SPAC context is whether the directors
possess sufficiently “deep business and personal ties” to the Sponsor to
ultimately jeopardize the directors’ ability to independently evaluate the
de-SPAC transaction.125

independence are relevant under Delaware law and likely influenced by [Delaware] law.”
152 A.3d 124, 131 (Del. 2016).
120. Klein, 2018 WL 6719717, at *12, n.109 (quoting In re Ezcorp Inc. Consulting
Agreement Deriv. Litig., No. 9962, 2016 WL 301245, at *36 (Del. Ch. 2016) (alterations
in original)).
121. 212 A.3d 805, 819 (Del. 2019). Specifically, it was a “reasonable inference that
there [were] very warm and thick personal ties of respect, loyalty, and affection between”
a recently retired, longtime employee, and now director of the family-run company and
the son of the company’s founder serving as its current CEO and Chairman “which
create[d] a reasonable doubt that [the director] could have impartially decided whether to
sue” the CEO and his subordinate. Id.
122. Id. at 808-09 (quoting In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 942
(Del. Ch. 2003)).
123. Id. at 808-16.
124. Id. at 808.
125. Id.
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III. WHY ENTIRE FAIRNESS IS THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Part will discuss why entire fairness is the proper standard under
which de-SPAC transactions should be reviewed. Section A will illustrate
why SPAC Sponsors qualify as controlling shareholders. Section B will
explain how the transaction provides the Sponsor with unique benefits
non-ratably shared with the other common stockholders, thereby making
the transaction a conflicted transaction. And Section C will demonstrate
that beyond presenting a conflicted controller transaction subjecting the
de-SPAC transaction to entire fairness, SPAC directors are interested and
lack independence, presenting alternative arguments that each require
entire fairness review.
A. SPAC SPONSORS QUALIFY AS CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS
As discussed in Part I, each SPAC structure varies but, by-and-large,
Sponsors lead the effort to incorporate the corporation, pick the board
members, own Founder Shares, sometimes own additional warrants, and
to some extent provide influence or at least prestige to the corporation.126
SPAC registration statements provide the best insight into what these
“other factors” look like in practice and what a court will likely consider
in its controller analysis. This Note has selected four SPACs to serve as
case studies and guide the analysis: Churchill Capital Corp III
(“Churchill”),127 FinServ Acquisition Corp.,128 Gores Holdings III, Inc.,129
and Northern Genesis Acquisition Corp. II.130 These SPACs were chosen
on the following factors: (1) their registration statements were
respectively prepared in different years; (2) the corporations are
represented by different law firms; and (3) each SPAC had announced
and closed their respective de-SPAC transactions at the time of this Note’s
publication. While the specifics of each SPAC will ultimately determine
See supra Section I.A.
See Churchill Cap. Corp III Registration Statement, supra note 30.
See FinServ Acquisition Corp., Amendment No. 2 to Registration Statement
(Form S!1/A) (Oct. 25, 2019) [hereinafter FinServ Acquisition Corp. Registration
Statement].
129. See Gores Holdings III, Inc., Amendment No. 1 to Registration Statement (Form
S!1/A) (Aug. 29, 2018) [hereinafter Gores Holdings III, Inc. Registration Statement].
130. See Northern Genesis Acquisition Corp. II, Amendment No. 2 to Registration
Statement (Form S!1/A) (Jan. 8, 2021) [hereinafter Northern Genesis Acquisition Corp.
II Registration Statement].
126.
127.
128.
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the outcome of the controller analysis, between their significant voting
share and the presence of such “other factors,” SPAC Sponsors will likely
qualify as controlling shareholders under Delaware law.131
In deciding whether a SPAC Sponsor will qualify as a controlling
shareholder, the controller analysis starts by examining the minority
blockholder’s voting share and consulting the registration statement for
further details of her influence and responsibilities within the SPAC. For
example, upon consummation of the initial offering, the SPAC
“[S]ponsor will own 20 [percent] of [the] issued and outstanding shares
of common stock (assuming [the Sponsor] does not purchase any units in
[the] offering).”132 With Founder Shares subject to transfer restrictions,
should a SPAC “seek stockholder approval of [its] initial business
combination,” it can “expect that [its] initial stockholders and their
permitted transferees will own at least 20 [percent] of [the] outstanding
shares of common stock at the time of any such stockholder vote.”133
Having established that a SPAC Sponsor will typically control at least 20
[percent] of the vote, the “other factors” can then be considered.
As previously discussed, “other factors”134 have included (1)
“managerial supremacy,”135 (2) “the minority blockholder’s role as a
company’s "hands-on’ CEO and "inspirational force’ who was "involved
in all aspects of the company’s business,’”136 and (3) company “public
statements acknowledging that the minority blockholder "[is] able to
exercise significant influence over [the] company’ and that a loss of the
blockholder "would have a material adverse effect on [its] business and
operations.’”137 These “other factors” will be discussed in turn.
In terms of “managerial supremacy,” Sponsors maintain effective
operational control over the SPAC.138 Until a SPAC “complete[s] [the]

131. In re Tesla Motors, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. CV 12711-VCS, 2018 WL 1560293,
at *14 (Del. Ch. 2018) (quoting Superior Vision Servs. v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co., 2006
WL 2521426, at *4 (Del. Ch. 2006)).
132. Northern Genesis Acquisition Corp. II Registration Statement, supra note 130,
at 45.
133. Churchill Cap. Corp III Registration Statement, supra note 30, at 45.
134. In re Tesla Motors, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 12711, 2020 WL 553902, at *4 (Del.
Ch. 2020) (quoting Superior Vision, 2006 WL 2521426, at *4).
135. Id. (quoting In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 552 (Del. Ch.
2003)).
136. Id.
137. Id. (quoting In re Zhongpin Inc. S’holders Litig., No. CV 7393-VCN, 2014 WL
6735457, at *7 (Del. Ch. 2014)).
138. Id. (quoting C!sive, 836 A.2d at 552).
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initial business combination, [it] will have no operations and will generate
no operating revenues.”139 SPACs “do not intend to have any full-time
employees prior to the completion of [the] initial business
combination.”140 Instead, directors serve as principal officers.141 So,
unlike a traditional corporation where directors oversee officers who then
manage and operate the business, SPAC directors control and manage
everything. In addition to establishing the board’s size, structure, and
terms as part of the SPAC formation process, the Sponsors also select the
initial directors.142 Effectively, the Sponsors stack the deck in their favor:
the initial directors are carefully selected to ensure they vote “for” the
Initial Business Combination. In some instances, “holders of [the Founder
Shares] will have the right to elect all of [the] directors prior to
consummation of [the] initial business combination and holders of [the]
public shares will not have the right to vote on the election of directors
during such time.”143 Moreover, the Sponsors, through their selection and
control over the directors, have complete “managerial supremacy”144 over
the only action a SPAC will take: choosing a merger partner. SPAC
management, in other words its directors, “will have virtually unrestricted
flexibility in identifying and selecting one or more prospective target
businesses . . . .”145 In short, Sponsors maintain clear “managerial
supremacy” over the SPAC.
As discussed in Section I.B, SPAC Sponsors drive the formation
process and, in many respects, could be considered an “inspirational
force” behind the endeavor.146 Beyond providing skills and expertise, the
SPAC Sponsor lends its reputation in return for outside capital.
Specifically, the Sponsor provides startup capital, structures the SPAC,
139. FinServ Acquisition Corp. Registration Statement, supra note 128, at 26;
Churchill Cap. Corp III Registration Statement, supra note 30, at 31.
140. FinServ Acquisition Corp. Registration Statement, supra note 128, at 45;
Churchill Cap. Corp III Registration Statement, supra note 30, at 49.
141. See FinServ Acquisition Corp. Registration Statement, supra note 128, at 100;
Churchill Cap. Corp III Registration Statement, supra note 30, at 110.
142. See Northern Genesis Acquisition Corp. II Registration Statement, supra note
130, at 89.
143. Churchill Cap. Corp III Registration Statement, supra note 30, at 111.
144. In re Tesla Motors, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 12711, 2020 WL 553902, at *4
(quoting In re Cysive Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 552 (Del. Ch. 2003)).
145. Churchill Cap. Corp III Registration Statement, supra note 30, at 88; GigCapital
3 Registration Statement supra note 29, at 41 (“[Management] will have virtually
unrestricted flexibility in identifying and selecting a prospective acquisition candidate.”).
146. In re Tesla Motors, 2020 WL 553902, at *4 (quoting C!sive, 836 A.2d at 552).
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appoints its directors, and often takes a leadership position within it.147 It
is not uncommon for a SPAC Sponsor to take on the role of CEO,
Chairman, or both.148 Much like the controlling shareholder in C!sive, a
SPAC Sponsor will likely exercise “more power than a typical CEO.”149
Just as public statements of the company can acknowledge the
minority blockholder’s influence and impact over the company, SPAC
Sponsors can make similar averments in registration statements and other
publicly filed reports.150 Of the four case studies selected, none plainly
state that “a loss of the blockholder "would have a material adverse effect
on our business and operations.’”151 However, each SPAC has recognized
that its Sponsors maintain “significant influence”152 or have the ability to
“effectively influence the outcome” of matters.153
In sum, the “other factors” referenced in previous controller inquiries
exist similarly in SPACs. Although the controller inquiry is a fact-specific
determination, SPAC Sponsors are likely to be considered controlling
shareholders: they maintain a 20 percent voting share at minimum, have
See supra Section I.B.
See Churchill Cap. Corp III Registration Statement, supra note 30, at 110
(Founder, Chairman, and CEO of SPAC Sponsor took on role of SPAC Chairman and
CEO); Gores Holdings III, Inc. Registration Statement, supra note 129, at 114 (Founder,
Chairman, and CEO of SPAC Sponsor took on role of SPAC Chairman).
149. In re Morton’s Rest. Grp., Inc. S’holders Litig., 74 A.3d 656, 665-66 (Del. Ch.
2013) (quoting C!sive, 836 A.2d at 551-52).
150. In re Tesla Motors, 2020 WL 553902, at *4 (quoting In re Zhongpin Inc.
S’holders Litig., No. CV 7393-VCN, 2014 WL 6735457, at *7 (Del. Ch. 2014)).
151. Id.
152. FinServ Acquisition Corp. Registration Statement, supra note 128, at 110-11
(“Because of this ownership block, our initial stockholders . . . will have significant
influence over the outcome of all matters requiring approval by our stockholders.”);
Churchill Cap. Corp III Registration Statement, supra note 30, at 57-58 (“[A]s a result of
their substantial ownership in our company, our initial stockholders may exert a
substantial influence on other actions requiring a stockholder vote, potentially in a
manner that you do not support, including . . . approval of major corporate transactions.”).
153. Northern Genesis Acquisition Corp. II Registration Statement, supra note 130,
at 95-96 (“Because of this ownership block, our sponsor may be able to effectively
influence the outcome of all matters requiring approval by our stockholders, amendments
to our amended and restated certificate of incorporation and approval of significant
corporate transactions, including approval of our initial business combination.”); Gores
Holdings III, Inc. Registration Statement, supra note 129, at 125 (“Because of this
ownership block, our initial stockholders may be able to effectively influence the
outcome of all matters requiring approval by our stockholders, including the election of
directors, amendments to our amended and restated certificate of incorporation and
approval of significant corporate transactions.”).
147.
148.
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full control over managerial decisions, drive the formation process, and
exert significant influence over corporate decisions. In short, “when
coupled with other factors,” SPAC Sponsors “dominate the corporate
decision-making process.”154
B. SPAC SPONSOR SHARE CONVERSION IS A CONFLICTED TRANSACTION
Conflicted controller transactions “fall into one of two categories: (a)
transactions where the controller stands on both sides; and (b) transactions
where the controller competes with the common stockholders for
consideration.”155 In other words, “the entire fairness framework governs
any transaction between a controller and the controlled corporation in
which the controller receives a non-ratable benefit.”156 As previously
described, examples of a non-ratable benefit include, but are not limited
to, cases of (1) disparate consideration, (2) differential consideration, or
(3) unique benefits.157 In a SPAC, the sponsors are not alleged to stand on
both sides of the transaction;158 sponsors are instead alleged to receive two
non-ratable benefits in association with the de-SPAC transaction: (i)
Founder Share conversion to common stock and (ii) purchase of private
placement warrants.
1. Founder Share Conversion to Common Stock
At issue in the de-SPAC transaction is whether the conversion of
Founder Shares into common shares at the time of the Initial Business
Combination constitute a “non-ratable benefit”159 or a “unique benefit”

154. In re Tesla Motors, Inc. S’holder Litig., 2018 WL 1560293, at *14 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 28, 2018) (quoting Superior Vision Servs., Inc. v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co., 2006 WL
2521426, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2006)) (emphasis added).
155. In re Crimson Expl. Inc. S’holder Litig., 2014 WL 5449419, at *12 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 24, 2014).
156. In re Ezcorp Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig., 2016 WL 301245, at
*11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016).
157. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
158. See Opening Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 28, In re
MultiPlan Corp. S’holders Litig. (Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 2021) (No. 2021-0300-LWW) (“There
are no allegations in the Complaint that Sponsor or any of the other Defendants stood on
both sides of the Acquisition.”).
159. In re Ezcorp Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig., 2016 WL 301245, at
*11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016).
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creating an actionable conflict.160 In the leading SPAC litigation and
challenge to the de-SPAC transaction, In re MultiPlan Corp. Stockholders
Litigation, the plaintiffs allege that the SPAC’s Sponsor “received a nonratable benefit to the exclusion of the Company’s other stockholders”
through the conversion of 20 million Founder Shares, purchased for only
$25,000, which were then “worth approximately $305 million” upon
conversion at the time of the merger’s closing.161 The plaintiffs further
point out that not only did the Sponsor receive a unique benefit, but the
Sponsor also had “unique interests inherent to Founder Shares” that
diverged from the interests of common stockholders.162 If the Sponsor
“failed to complete an Initial Business Combination,” the Sponsor would
be wiped out, as its Founder Shares would be worthless.163 Where “public
stockholders would prefer no Initial Business Combination at all if the
proposed deal was perceived as being worth less than $10 per share,” the
plaintiffs allege that the Sponsor “(and all Founder Shareholders) had a
strong incentive to conceal bad news about the merger target in order to
avoid the deal’s rejection.”164 The defendants contend that the Founder
Share conversion is a “structural feature of the SPAC#which was
disclosed in the Churchill IPO documents, would have been triggered in
any de-SPAC transaction, and was not unique to the Acquisition” at
issue.165 The defendants note that “all Class A shares participated in the
Acquisition on the same terms, and [further argue that] Delaware courts
"routinely’ recognize that providing decision-makers with equity
incentives "aligns those decision-makers’ interests with stockholder
interests; maximizing price.’”166 The defendants continue by highlighting
the additional measures taken by the Sponsor, particularly the lockup
160. Flannery v. Genomic Health, Inc., 2021 WL 3615540, at *1317 (Del. Ch. Aug.
16, 2021) (quoting IRA Tr. FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane, 2017 WL 7053964, at *6 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 11, 2017)).
161. Plaintiffs’ Omnibus Answering Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss at 32-33, In re MultiPlan Corp. S’holder Litig. (Del. Ch. Apr. 09, 2021) (No.
2021-0300-LWW).
162. Id. at 33.
163. See id.
164. Id.
165. Opening Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 30, In re
MultiPlan Corp. S’holders Litig., (Del. Ch. Apr. 09, 2021) (No. 2021-0300-LWW).
166. Id. at 30 n.80 (quoting In re BioClinica, Inc. S’holder Litig., 2013 WL 5631233,
at *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2013) (“Delaware courts recognize that stock ownership by
decision-makers aligns those decision-makers’ interests with stockholder interests;
maximizing price . . . . Courts have therefore routinely held that an interest in options
vesting does not violate the duty of loyalty.”)).
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provisions and vesting schedule tied to the performance of the common
stock, to ensure an alignment of interests with common stockholders. 167
But the defendants’ arguments are unconvincing and a misapplication of
Delaware law.
The defendants’ first contention, that the Founder Share conversion
“was not unique to the Acquisition,”168 ignores the case law which
establishes that the benefit received must be unique to the controller over
other public shareholders, not that the benefit is so unique that it only
appears in the transaction at issue.
Next, the defendants’ argument that the Sponsor participated in the
transaction “on the same terms as all other Churchill shares”169 by
definition would mean that the Sponsor received ratable benefits as the
common stockholders. But again, this ignores the case law, particularly
In re CBS Corp. Stockholder Class Action & Derivative Litig., where the
Court held that even if a “transaction appear[s] superficially to treat all
stockholders equally,”170 the transaction may practically provide a nonratable benefit to the controller.
Defendants’ argument defending the Founder Share conversion on
the grounds that equity incentives are well-recognized by Delaware courts
as a means to align the interests of decision-makers and stockholders
likewise misses the mark.171 First, Founder Shares are not like other equity
incentives. Typical equity incentives are tied to operational metrics, share
price, or other strategic goals. Founder shares are solely tied to the

See id. at 31-32.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 29 (“[T]he shares held by Sponsor and the other Defendants participated
in the Acquisition on the same terms as all other Churchill shares . . . .”).
170. In re CBS Corp. S’holder Class Action & Derivative Litig., 2021 WL 268779,
at *36 (Del. Ch. Jan. 27, 2021), as corrected (Feb. 4, 2021).
171. Opening Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 30 n.80, In re
MultiPlan Corp. S’holder Litig., (Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 2021) (No. 2021-0300-LWW)
(“[S]ince all Class A shares participated in the Acquisition on the same terms, and
Delaware courts "routinely’ recognize that providing decision-makers with equity
incentives "aligns those decision-makers’ interests with stockholder interests;
maximizing price.’”) (quoting In re BioClinica, Inc. S’holder Litig., 2013 WL 5631233,
at *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2013) (“Delaware courts recognize that stock ownership by
decision-makers aligns those decision-makers’ interests with stockholder interests;
maximizing price . . . . Courts have therefore routinely held that an interest in options
vesting does not violate the duty of loyalty.”)).
167.
168.
169.
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consummation of an initial business transaction.172 Through their status
as controllers via their effective vote share and control of the board,
Sponsors maintain control over the accomplishment of such an event. In
contrast, executives only maintain some control over meeting the target
metrics in a typical equity incentive plan. Directors are “self-interested
when they . . . expect to "derive any [material] personal financial benefit
from [a transaction] in the sense of self-dealing.’”173 The MultiPlan
plaintiffs allege that the director-defendants would receive millions of
dollars from their Founder Shares; at the pleading stage, such well-pled
allegations present a reasonable inference of self-dealing.174
Finally, the defendants argue that stock ownership by decisionmakers aligns the interests of decision-makers and shareholders around
the common goal of maximizing stock price.175 While generally true, this
argument diverges from the reality of SPACs in two ways. In a typical
company, “[a]t bottom, controlling stockholders have "interests identical
to other stockholders: to maximize the value of [their] shares.’”176 That
remains true in SPACs in both the abstract and on a long-term basis. But
the realities of the structure and inherent incentives muddy the waters.
Controllers do share a common interest with other stockholders:
172. Id. at 1 (“Following approval of a de-SPAC transaction, the founder shares
convert into 20 [percent] of the SPAC’s common stock immediately before the closing
of the proposed transaction, and the sponsor then participates in the proposed transaction
on the same terms as all other SPAC stockholders.”).
173. Calesa Assoc., L.P. v. Am. Cap., Ltd., 2016 WL 770251, at *11 (Del. Ch. Feb.
29, 2016) (citing Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 23 (Del. Ch. 2002)).
174. See Plaintiffs’ Omnibus Answering Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions
to Dismiss at 37, In re MultiPlan Corp. S’holder Litig., (Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 2021) (No.
2021-0300-LWW) (plaintiffs alleged that the directors collectively comprising a majority
of the Board “were self-interested in effectuating the Merger because they each received
millions of dollars in proceeds from their Founder Shares that would not have been
available had the Merger been rejected.”).
175. Opening Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 30 n.80, In re
MultiPlan Corp. S’holder Litig., (Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 2021) (No. 2021-0300-LWW)
(“[S]ince all Class A shares participated in the Acquisition on the same terms, and
Delaware courts "routinely’ recognize that providing decision-makers with equity
incentives "aligns those decision-makers’ interests with stockholder interests;
maximizing price.’”) (quoting In re BioClinica, Inc. S’holder Litig., 2013 WL 5631233,
at *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2013) (“Delaware courts recognize that stock ownership by
decision-makers aligns those decision-makers’ interests with stockholder interests;
maximizing price . . . . Courts have therefore routinely held that an interest in options
vesting does not violate the duty of loyalty.”)).
176. Flannery v. Genomic Health, Inc., 2021 WL 3615540, at *17 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16,
2021) (quoting Morton%s, 74 A.3d at 666-67).
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maximizing the value of their shares. But in the short-term, those interests
decidedly diverge. At the outset, controllers act to maximize the value of
their shares through effectuating a de-SPAC transaction: if no
combination is consummated, their Founder Shares expire worthless.
Thus, controllers are incentivized to choose an! initial business
combination over none at all. In contrast to controllers, common
stockholders only maximize the value of their shares by combining with
the right company; and if such an opportunity is unavailable, common
stockholders prefer no deal (and will thus redeem their shares) over an!
deal. But when the Founder Shares do convert to common stock, the
interests of controllers and other stockholders realign in maximizing the
value of the commonly held shares. Although Delaware courts have
recognized that a controller’s efforts to seek the best price may cure any
deficiencies in a sale process,177 SPACs are the acquiring party in the
merger, so this reasoning is not directly comparable. There is no such
lodestar of the “best price” available.
Simply stated, the Founder Share conversion, which occurs as part
of the de-SPAC transaction, is only available to the holders of Founder
Shares, namely the controlling SPAC Sponsors. That is a unique benefit
to the controller. So, while it is true that the controllers participate “on the
same terms” 178 as the common stockholders, that participation only takes
place after the Founder Share conversion occurs. Therefore, although the
de-SPAC transaction “appear[s] superficially to treat all stockholders
equally,”179 it is likely an actionable conflict under Delaware law.180

177. See id. (citing Goodwin v. Live Entm’t, Inc., 1999 WL 64265, at *27 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 25, 1999), aff’d, 741 A.2d 16 (Del. 1999) (noting a controller’s “natural desire to
obtain the best price for its shares”). See also In re Synthes, Inc. S’holder Litig., 50 A.3d
1022, 1035 (Del. Ch. Aug. 17, 2012) (explaining a controller’s “natural incentive to
obtain the best price for [its] shares”)).
178. Opening Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 29, In re
MultiPlan Corp. S’holder Litig., (Del. Ch. Apr. 09, 2021) (No. 2021-0300-LWW)
(“[T]he shares held by Sponsor and the other Defendants participated in the Acquisition
on the same terms as all other Churchill shares . . . .”).
179. In re CBS Corp. S’holder Class Action & Derivative Litig., 2021 WL 268779,
at *36 (Del. Ch. Jan. 27, 2021), as corrected (Feb. 4, 2021).
180. See Flannery v. Genomic Health, Inc., 2021 WL 3615540, at *17 (Del. Ch. Aug.
16, 2021) (quoting IRA Tr. FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane, 2017 WL 7053964, at *6 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 11, 2017)).
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2. Purchase of Private Placement Warrants
Alternatively, the opportunity afforded to the SPAC Sponsors to
provide a private investment presents an additional unique benefit to the
Sponsors. “In advance of signing an acquisition agreement, the SPAC will
often arrange committed debt or equity financing, such as a PIPE
commitment, to finance a portion of the purchase price for the business
combination and thereafter publicly announce both the acquisition
agreement and the committed financing.”181 When such an opportunity is
uniquely afforded to the holder of Founder Shares, it can be considered a
non-ratable or unique benefit.
In MultiPlan, the plaintiffs allege that “at the same time as the IPO,
the Sponsor purchased $23 million in private placement warrants . . . .” 182
Specifically, the “Sponsor purchased 23 million Private Placement
Warrants for $1.00 each. On the record date, these Private Placement
Warrants had appreciated in value to be worth $50.6 million.”183 In
addition, “[s]ome of the consideration contemplated by the Merger
Agreement came from PIPE Investors, who agreed to buy shares and
warrants worth $1.3 billion.”184 Defendants argue that “[t]he private
placement warrants#which only have value if the Company’s stock price
reaches $12.50 or $11.50 (depending on the warrant) at least one year
after the Acquisition#likewise aligned the interests of Sponsor” and the
public stockholders.185 But that argument again misses the point of the
conflicted transaction inquiry: common stockholders were not afforded
the opportunity to participate in this aspect of the transaction, therefore
this qualifies as a non-ratable or unique benefit to the controller. As such,

181.
182.

Layne & Lenahan, supra note 1.
Plaintiffs’ Omnibus Answering Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss at 32-33, In re MultiPlan Corp. S’holder Litig., 15 (Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 2021) (No.
2021-0300-LWW).
183. Id. at 35 (citing Complaint $ 57 (citing Churchill Cap. Corp III, Definitive Proxy
Statement (Schedule 14A), at 116 (Sept. 18, 2020)).
184. Id. at 18 (citing Complaint $ 57 (citing Churchill Cap. Corp III, Definitive Proxy
Statement (Schedule 14A), at 100 (Sept. 18, 2020)).
185. Reply Brief in Further Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 11, In re
MultiPlan Corp. S’holder Litig., (Del. Ch. Apr. 09, 2021) (No. 2021-0300-LWW) (citing
Opening Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 11, In re MultiPlan Corp.
S’holder Litig., (Del. Ch. Apr. 09, 2021) (No. 2021-0300-LWW).
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it is an actionable conflict which subjects the de-SPAC transaction to
entire fairness review.186
C. ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENTS SUPPORT THE ENTIRE FAIRNESS
STANDARD
Entire fairness may be required for a de-SPAC transaction where a
majority of the directors are (i) interested in the transaction or (ii) lack
independence on account of their preexisting personal or working
relationships with the Sponsor.
1. Directors Compensated with Founder Shares Are Interested in the
Transaction
An “open question with respect to SPACs is whether the Founder
Shares will be sufficiently material so as to create a conflict of interest for
the directors.”187 To start, “SPAC directors are more highly compensated
than directors at typical public companies.”188 Specifically, “the director
of the median SPAC received 29,375 Founder Shares, while the director
of the average SPAC received 38,981 Founder[] Shares.”189 As a result,
“the average SPAC director receives approximately $400,000 in director
compensation if the SPAC consummates a transaction, but receives
nothing if no deal is completed.”190 Typically, directors are only
compensated through Founder Shares, and SPAC registration statements
explicitly state that “none of [the executive] officers[,] directors [or
director nominees] . . . have received an! cash compensation for services

186. See Flannery v. Genomic Health, Inc., 2021 WL 3615540, at *17 (Del. Ch. Aug.
16, 2021) (quoting IRA Tr. FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane, 2017 WL 7053964, at *6 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 11, 2017)).
187. Fortney, supra note 14, at 11.
188. Id. at 8 (citing Rebecca Burton & Peter Kim, S&P 500 Director Compensation
Trends in 2020, WILLISTOWERSWATSON (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.willistowers
watson.com/en-US/Insights/2020/12/S-P-500-director-compensation-trends-in-2020
[https://perma.cc/7H25-7UMA] (“In 2019, the average director of an S&P 500 company
received $290,053 in compensation, of which $107,500 was cash and the remainder was
stock or options. This is %25 [percent] less than the average SPAC director earns.”)).
189. Id. at 6.
190. Id. at 5.
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rendered. . . .”191 In comparison, “public company directors typically are
paid cash or a mix of cash and stock, and the payment does not depend on
the occurrence of a particular event, such as a merger.”192
“Specific information about the wealth of particular individuals is
not generally available” at the pleading stage, so “magnitude of the
remuneration” when paired with other factors is generally sufficient to
“support an inference of materiality.”193 At the pleading stage, plaintiffs
can thus point to the size of the compensation, along with additional facts
such as whether the director compensation is the primary source of
income, how the director income compares to the director’s net worth, or
whether the director has been previously employed by the Sponsor, to
support their allegation of materiality.194
2. Directors with Pree"isting Sponsor Relationship Are Not Sufficientl!
Independent
A director’s independence and ability to impartially make a business
decision is a context specific determination. For example, “the decision
whether to sue someone is materially different and more important than
the decision whether to part company with that person on a vote about
corporate governance, and [Delaware] law’s precedent recognizes that the
nature of the decision at issue must be considered in determining whether
a director is independent.”195 The decision to vote for or against a SPAC’s
initial business combination is of considerable importance to the SPAC’s
directors. The SPAC’s entire purpose is to effectuate an initial business
combination and the value of the Sponsor’s Founder Shares is dependent
on the outcome of the vote. In some instances, a Sponsor’s Founder
Shares could be worth several hundred million dollars if the Initial
191. Id. at 7 (citing Golden Falcon Acquisition Corp., Prospectus (424B4), at 136
(Dec. 21, 2020)). See also Northern Genesis Acquisition Corp. II Registration Statement,
supra note 130, at 89.
192. Fortney, supra note 187, at 5 (citing Rebecca Burton & Peter Kim, S&P 500
Director Compensation Trends in 2020, WILLISTOWERSWATSON (Dec. 15, 2020),
https://www.willistowerswatson.com/en-US/Insights/2020/12/S-P-500-directorcompensation-trends-in-2020 [https://perma.cc/M8DG-5FN6]).
193. Voigt v. Metcalf, 2020 WL 614999, at *15 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2020).
194. See Plaintiffs’ Omnibus Answering Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions
to Dismiss, at 37-38, In re MultiPlan Corp. S’holder Litig., (Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 2021) (No.
2021-0300-LWW). Plaintiffs allege that compensation of $3.2 million, $8.7 million, and
$43.6 million for director defendants can be presumed to be material at the pleading stage.
Id.
195. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 819 (Del. 2019).
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Business Combination is effectuated. Voting against the transaction is
similarly adversarial to the decision to sue and may be more consequential
monetarily. Moreover, SPAC “directors are being compensated not by the
corporation, but by a group of interested shareholders!i.e., the Sponsor!
that unilaterally appointed the directors, thus making the directors even
less likely to be considered independent from the Sponsor.”196
D. RECENT DELAWARE DECISIONS POINT TO ENTIRE FAIRNESS AS THE
APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Three 2022 Delaware court decisions point towards entire fairness
as the appropriate standard of review; however, these decisions have not
yet established whether entire fairness is to be presumed generally for deSPAC transactions.197
In January 2022, Vice Chancellor Lori W. Will issued a decision in
the aforementioned MutliPlan litigation, finding that entire fairness was
the appropriate standard at the motion to dismiss stage.198 There, the
plaintiffs pointed to and successfully pled that entire fairness should apply
for “two independent!and individually sufficient!reasons[:]. . . [(1)], the
de-SPAC [transaction], including the opportunity to redeem, was a
conflicted controller transaction” and “[(2)], a majority of the [SPAC
board] was conflicted either because the directors were self-interested or
because they lack independence from” the Sponsor.199
In evaluating the argument for finding a conflicted controller
transaction, Vice Chancellor Will focused on the “unique benefit”
inquiry, examining the Sponsor’s holdings throughout the transaction
before ultimately concluding that one,200 if not multiple, unique benefits
196.
197.

Fortney, supra note 187, at 11.
See In re MultiPlan Corp. S’holders Litig., 268 A.3d 784 (Del. Ch. Jan. 3, 2022);
Blue v. Fireman, No. CV 2021-0268-MTZ, 2022 WL 593899 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 2022);
In re Lordstown Motors Corp. S’holders Litig., No. CV 2021-1066-LWW, 2022 WL
678597 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 2022).
198. “Given the allegations of the Complaint, . . . [and] for purposes of the motions
to dismiss, the alleged disclosure violations sufficiently give rise to a lack of overall
fairness.” In re MultiPlan Corp., 268 A.3d at 816-17.
199. Id. at 809.
200. Id. at 810 (finding the allegations identified a unique benefit “when Class A
stockholders held redemption rights . . . [the founder] (who controlled the Sponsor) had
an economic interest in 70 [percent] of the Class B shares [and both] the Class B shares
and the Private Placement Warrants held by the Sponsor would be worthless if [the
SPAC] did not complete” an initial business combination).
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could be reasonably inferred.201 Notably, the defendants contended that
“that the Sponsor’s promote (in the form of [Founder Shares]) cannot
trigger entire fairness because this "structural feature’ would appear in
"any de-SPAC transaction’ and "was not unique to the [a]cquisition.’”202
But Vice Chancellor Will found this argument unconvincing, reasoning
that the use of this structure “by other SPACs does not cure it of
conflicts[,] [n]or does the technical legality of the de-SPAC
mechanics.”203 Interestingly, Vice Chancellor Will did not go so far as to
hold that entire fairness should therefore be appropriate for all de-SPAC
transactions.
As for the plaintiffs’ second argument that a majority of the board
was conflicted, Vice Chancellor Will examined the potential conflicts,
first considering the directors’ self-interest then lack of independence,
before finding both theories supported entire fairness review.204 In
evaluating director self-interest, Vice Chancellor Will not only
contemplated the directors’ interests as alleged, but also discussed their
interests in a hypothetical value-decreasing merger based on the SPAC
structure; in both scenarios, she found, the directors’ interest would
exceed the threshold of materiality at the motion to dismiss stage, thus
supporting entire fairness.205 As for the directors’ lack of independence,
Vice Chancellor Will considered both the business and personal
relationships between the directors and the Sponsor, finding that “the
directors each had a personal or employment relationship with or received
lucrative business opportunities from [the Sponsor,]” and “the existence
of [those] interests and relationships is enough to defeat a motion to
dismiss.”206
Having concluded on multiple grounds that entire fairness was the
appropriate standard of review, and that the plaintiffs sufficiently met
201. Id. at 811 (“It can also be reasonably inferred that [the founder] gained a unique
benefit from the redemption offer itself#it brought him one step closer to consummating
a transaction that allegedly benefitted him to the detriment of Class A stockholders.”).
202. Id. at 812 (quoting Opening Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
at 30, In re MultiPlan Corp. S’holders Litig. (Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 2021) (No. 2021-0300LWW)).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 812-16.
205. Id. at 810 (reasoning that if even if a significant discount was applied to the
directors’ shares, “the directors holding the fewest amount of founder shares would still
hold shares worth over half a million dollars post-merger . . . [which] is presumptively
material at the motion to dismiss stage.”).
206. Id. at 814-15.
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their pleading burdens, Vice Chancellor Will denied the defendants’
motion to dismiss, and the case has proceeded into discovery.207
In February 2022, the Court of Chancery again examined a de-SPAC
transaction in Blue v. Fireman, holding that entire fairness was the
appropriate standard of review for the plaintiffs’ fiduciary duty claim, but,
at the same time, noting that the decision was based on the actions of the
controlling shareholder leading up to the transaction, rather than the
SPAC structure itself.208 Specifically, the target company in the de-SPAC
transaction had raised debt financing in multiple instances from the
defendant-creditors in the years leading up to the de-SPAC transaction.209
The debt holdings gave the defendant-creditors voting control over the
target company, and as the target company finalized the terms of its deSPAC transaction, the defendant-creditors demanded amendments to its
debt holdings and threatened to withhold support to the de-SPAC
transaction without such changes effectuated.210 Ultimately, the board
assented to the amendments, and the de-SPAC transaction closed.211 The
plaintiffs challenged the de-SPAC transaction as a conflicted controller
transaction, arguing that it diverted value from the plaintiffs and should
be reviewed under entire fairness.212 Vice Chancellor Morgan T. Zurn
agreed, finding the defendant-creditors to be controllers, as the terms of
the debt provided them with 83 percent of the target company’s voting
power.213 Importantly, Vice Chancellor Zurn turned to the “unique
benefit” inquiry utilized by Vice Chancellor Will in evaluating whether
the de-SPAC transaction presented a conflicted controller transaction,
finding that defendant-creditors competed with the target company’s
“common stockholders by extracting a different benefit (the
[a]mendments) out of the Merger consideration.”214 Thus, entire fairness
applied.215
Lastly, in March 2022, the Court of Chancery denied a motion to stay
a putative class action challenging a de-SPAC transaction pending the
207. In re Multiplan Corp. S’holders Litig., Docket No. 2021-0300 (Del. Ch. argued
Sept. 21, 2021). See generall! id.
208. See generall! Blue v. Fireman, 2022 WL 593899 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 2022).
209. Id. at *1-4.
210. Id.
211. Id. at *4.
212. Id.
213. Id. at *3, 16.
214. Id. at *17.
215. Id.
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resolution of a federal securities class action but commented no further
on the prospective standard of review over the transaction.216 Again
writing for the court, Vice Chancellor Will noted that “allegations that the
defendants breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty and impaired the
exercise of stockholders’ redemption rights in the context of a de-SPAC
transaction . . . raise "novel issues’ akin to those that this court was
presented with in a matter of first impression earlier this year.”217 The
Vice Chancellor noted that the two class actions addressed
“fundamentally different” issues: where the securities class action alleged
“false and misleading disclosures,” the fiduciary duties class action
argued “that the defendants harmed the putative class members by
impairing the informed exercise of their redemption rights to the
defendants’ benefit.”218 Due to Delaware’s “substantial interest in
addressing the issues presented by this case . . . [and the] limited
overlap#in terms of the parties, issues, and potential remedies#
between” the two actions, the motion to stay was denied.219
Of these three decisions examining de-SPAC transactions, two
decisions found entire fairness review appropriate but only one decision
based its findings on the underlying SPAC structure.220 Thus, an open
question remains as to whether Delaware courts will presume entire
fairness as the standard of review for every de-SPAC transaction going
forward.221

216. See generall! In re Lordstown Motors Corp. S’holders Litig., No. CV 20211066-LWW, 2022 WL 678597 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 2022).
217. Id. at *3 (citing In re MultiPlan Corp. S’holders Litig., 268 A.3d 784, 812 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 3, 2022)).
218. Id. at *4.
219. Id. at *5.
220. In re MultiPlan Corp. S’holders Litig., 268 A.3d 784, 809 (Del. Ch. Jan. 3, 2022).
221. Of note, two of the leading academics on SPACs have argued in a recent paper
that entire fairness is the appropriate standard of review for the de-SPAC transaction. See
generall! Michael Klausner & Michael Ohlrogge, SPAC Governance: In Need of Judicial
Review (Stan. L. & Econ. Olin, Working Paper No. 564, 2021), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3967693 [https://perma.cc/8F9D-QDE7] (concluding “that unless truly
independent directors approve a merger and oversee disclosures to shareholders, the
sponsor’s and board’s actions should be subject to entire fairness review.”).
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IV. APPLYING MF! FORMALITIES TO DE-SPAC TRANSACTIONS
SHOULD SECURE BUSINESS JUDGMENT REVIEW
In Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., the Supreme Court of Delaware
established that “business judgment is the standard of review that should
govern mergers between a controlling stockholder and its corporate
subsidiary, where the merger is conditioned ab initio upon both the
approval of an independent, adequately-empowered Special Committee
that fulfills its duty of care; and the uncoerced, informed vote of a
majority of the minority stockholders.”222 Based upon this seminal
decision and the case law which has followed, applying the MFW
formalities to a de-SPAC transaction should similarly earn business
judgment review.
A. ADDITIONAL PROTECTIONS ARE REQUIRED FOR CONFLICTED
CONTROLLER TRANSACTIONS TO SECURE BUSINESS JUDGMENT REVIEW
Delaware law “has required that transaction[s] [with conflicted
controllers] be reviewed for substantive fairness even if the transaction
was negotiated by independent directors or approved by the minority
stockholders.”223 Much like an “800!pound gorilla whose urgent hunger
. . . is likely to frighten less powerful primates,”224 a conflicted controller
“is able to exert coercive influence over the board and unaffiliated
stockholders” in the corporation.225 Approval by the minority
stockholders is similarly insufficient to cleanse a conflicted controller
transaction “because, in such instances, the stockholder vote is presumed

222. 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014), overruled b! Flood v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., 195 A.3d
754 (Del. 2018).
223. Tornetta v. Musk, 250 A.3d 793, 800 (Del. Ch. 2019) (quoting Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
The Delaware Wa!: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges We
(and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 678 (2005)).
224. In re Pure Res., Inc. S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 436 (Del. Ch. 2002) (Strine,
V.C.). Specifically, then-Vice Chancellor Strine colorfully described a controlling
stockholder as an “800!pound gorilla whose urgent hunger for the rest of the bananas is
likely to frighten less powerful primates like putatively independent directors who might
well have been hand-picked by the gorilla (and who at the very least owed their seats on
the board to his support).” Id.
225. Tornetta v. Musk, 250 A.3d 793, 800 (Del. Ch. 2019).
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statutory protections of disinterested board and stockholder approval,
because both protections are potentially undermined by the influence of
the controller.”227
B. MFW PROTECTIONS PROVIDE APPLICABLE SAFEGUARDS
“MFW provides a roadmap that allows fiduciaries to engage in
conflicted controller transactions worthy of pleadings stage business
judgment deference.”228 Specifically, “MFW’s "dual protections’ are
meant to "neutralize’ the conflicted controller’s "presumptively coercive
influence’ so that judicial second-guessing is no longer required.”229 The
“comprehensive set of procedural protections#that the [MFW] court
summarized as "disinterested board and stockholder approval’#operate
to restore the court’s confidence in both constituencies’ decisions.”230
Case law has established that “[MFW] does apply to conflicted oneside controller transactions.”231 In Larkin v. Shah, the court wrote that
“[t]he dual procedural protections referenced in [MFW] operate similarly
in the one-sided controller context.”232 A year later, in In re Martha
Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, the court found
“business judgment deference is appropriate at the pleadings stage” where
227. In re CBS Corp. S’holder Class Action & Derivative Litig., 2021 WL 268779,
at *33 (Del. Ch. Jan. 27, 2021), as corrected (Feb. 4, 2021) (quoting In re Crimson Expl.
Inc. S’holder Litig., 2014 WL 5449419, at *9 (Del. Ch. Oct. 24, 2014)).
228. Tornetta, 250 A.3d at 810.
229. Id. (quoting In re Rouse Prop., 2018 WL 1226015, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 9, 2018)).
230. The court listed the following six conditions that, if met, reduce the standard of
review in “controller buyout” contexts to business judgment:

(i) [T]he controller conditions the procession of the transaction on the
approval of both a Special Committee and a majority of the minority
stockholders; (ii) the Special Committee is independent; (iii) the
Special Committee is empowered to freely select its own advisors and
to say no definitively; (iv) the Special Committee meets its duty of
care in negotiating a fair price; (v) the vote of the minority is informed;
and (vi) there is no coercion of the minority.
Larkin v. Shah, C.A. No. 10918-VCS, 2016 WL 4485447, at *9 n. 53 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25,
2016) (citing M & F Worldwide, 88 A.3d at 645).
231. In re Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 11202VCS, 2017 WL 3568089, at *2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2017).
232. 2016 WL 4485447, at *9, *11 (“[T]ransactions involving a conflicted controller
. . . remain subject to entire fairness review absent the robust suite of procedural
protections listed in M & F Worldwide.”).
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“the Company’s former controlling stockholder and namesake, Martha
Stewart,” “followed the [MFW] road map with precision and [the dual
protections] were in place at the moment Stewart began to negotiate for
consideration over and above what would be paid to the other
stockholders.”233 Later, in Tornetta v. Musk, the court highlighted that had
the board followed the applicable MFW framework,234 “[b]usiness
judgment deference at the pleadings stage would then be justified.”235 As
courts have applied the MFW jurisprudence to a variety of corporate
transactions, extending its protections to the de-SPAC transaction, which
is inherently a one-sided conflicted controller transaction, would likely be
a permissible next step.236
C. MFW FORMALITIES CAN BE EASILY APPLIED TO DE-SPAC
TRANSACTIONS
The typical de-SPAC transaction process has much of the necessary
framework already in place to meet “MFW’s dual requirements#
approval by an independent Special Committee and an affirmative vote
by a majority of the minority stockholders . . . .”237 Although a typical deSPAC transaction does not seek approval by an independent Special
Committee,238 SPACs are required by the exchanges to have a majority of

233.
234.

2017 WL 3568089, at *1-2.
Specifically, Vice Chancellor Slights wrote:
Had the Board ensured from the outset of “substantive economic
negotiations” that both of Tesla’s qualified decision makers#an
independent, fully functioning Compensation Committee and the
minority stockholders#were able to engage in an informed review of
the Award, followed by meaningful (i.e., otherwise uncoerced)
approval, the Court’s reflexive suspicion of Musk’s coercive
influence over the outcome would be abated. Business judgment
deference at the pleadings stage would then be justified.

Tornetta v. Musk, 250 A.3d 793, 812 (Del. Ch. 2019) (quoting Olenik v. Lodzinski, 208
A.3d 704, 715 (Del. 2019)).
235. Id.
236. In re Martha Stewart Living, 2017 WL 3568089, at *2.
237. Flood v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., 195 A.3d 754, 756 (Del. 2018).
238. There is no reference to a Special Committee by name or substance in the
registration statements of the four SPACs selected as case studies.
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the board comprised of independent directors.239 As discussed in Section
I.C, the typical de-SPAC transaction solicits and requires the affirmative
vote of minority shareholders to proceed; however since the SPAC
Sponsor controls 20 percent voting share, “only 37.5 [percent] of the
public shares [are needed] to achieve a majority vote and approve the
transaction.”240 Therefore, to meet the MFW requirements and earn
business judgment deference, three subtle changes are needed: (1)
conditioning the business combination ab initio on meeting the following
two requirements, (2) raising the approval threshold of other shareholders
to be a majority of the minority, and (3) introducing an adequately
empowered independent Special Committee.241
First, “what is critical for the application of the business judgment
rule is that the controller accept that no transaction goes forward without
[S]pecial [C]ommittee and disinterested stockholder approval early in the
process and before there has been any economic horse trading.”242
Conditioning the de-SPAC transaction ab initio upon the approval of an
independent Special Committee and the affirmative vote of the majority
of the minority accomplishes exactly that.243 In a traditional merger, “the
correct time at which to determine if the [MFW] ab initio requirement has
been met is the point where the controlling stockholder actually sits down
with an acquiror to negotiate for” the non-ratable benefit.244 For a de-

239.
240.
241.

NASDAQ, supra note 28; N.Y. STOCK EXCH., supra note 27.
Layne & Lenahan, supra note 1.
Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014), overruled on
other grounds b! Flood v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., 195 A.3d 754 (Del. 2018) (rev’d on other
grounds).
[B]usiness judgment is the standard of review that should govern
mergers between a controlling stockholder and its corporate
subsidiary, where the merger is conditioned ab initio upon both the
approval of an independent, adequately-empowered Special
Committee that fulfills its duty of care; and the uncoerced, informed
vote of a majority of the minority stockholders.
Id.

242.
243.
244.

Flood v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., 195 A.3d 754, 756 (Del. 2018).
M & F Worldwide, 88 A.3d at 644-46.
In re Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 11202VCS, 2017 WL 3568089, at *19 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2017). “In the parlance of In re MFW,
the "get-go’ of the process in the disparate consideration case is the moment the controller
and third party begin to negotiate.” Id. (quoting In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d
496, 530 (Del. Ch. 2013), aff%d sub nom. M&F Worldwide, 88 A.3d 635).
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SPAC transaction, the point of inquiry is comparable to a traditional
merger: when the target company is identified and the SPAC Sponsor
“actually sits down” to negotiate.245 Effectively, the business combination
should be conditioned before there is “any economic horse trading.”246
Alternatively, a SPAC could instead include such conditions in the
registration statement to codify the appropriate negotiation procedures
and ensure that they will be met.
Next, the public vote threshold needed to approve the de-SPAC
transaction must be raised to a majority of the public shares held. Section
I.A discussed the common SPAC structure, where “at least 20 [percent]
of the SPAC’s outstanding shares will be committed to vote in favor of a
transaction, requiring only 37.5 [percent] of the public shares to achieve
a majority vote and approve the transaction.”247 But to meet the MFW
requirements, such threshold needs to be raised above 50 percent of the
publicly held shares.248 The solicitation process does not require further
changes beyond increasing the public vote threshold to satisfy the
majority of the minority standard.
Finally, a SPAC must create an independent Special Committee to
evaluate and approve the Initial Business Combination. “Delaware law
has long encouraged boards to form [S]pecial [C]ommittees when
confronted with a conflicted transaction to neutralize the influence any
conflicted board members might have on the decision-making process.” 249
The typical SPAC is already structured to do so: to be listed on either
major U.S. stock exchange, a SPAC must have a board comprised of a
majority of independent directors. 250 With independent directors already
in place, a SPAC can satisfy the MFW framework by creating an
adequately empowered251 Special Committee comprised of only its
In re Martha Stewart Living, 2017 WL 3568089, at *19.
S!nutra, 195 A.3d at 756.
Layne & Lenahan, supra note 1.
M&F Worldwide, 88 A.3d at 644 (“[T]he uncoerced, informed vote of a majority
of the minority stockholders.”).
249. In re CBS Corp. S’holder Class Action & Derivative Litig., No. 2020-0111-JRS,
2021 WL 268779, at *39 (Del. Ch. Jan. 27, 2021), as corrected (Feb. 4, 2021). See id. at
*41 n.441-45 (summarizing issues in Delaware case law regarding how much negotiating
power independent directors practically possess in conflicted controller transactions).
250. NASDAQ, supra note 28; N.Y. STOCK EXCH., supra note 27.
251. The Delaware “Supreme Court has recognized that the requisite degree of
fiduciary independence may nevertheless be found lacking if the committee and
controller fail, at least, to attempt to ensure that the committee is empowered to negotiate
245.
246.
247.
248.
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in place, a SPAC can satisfy the MFW framework by creating an
adequately empowered251 Special Committee comprised of only its
independent directors to evaluate and approve the Initial Business
Combination.
D. CASE STUDIES ILLUSTRATE THE APPLICATION OF MFW FORMALITIES
The SPACs previously discussed in Section I.B and Section III.D
again provide worthwhile case studies to understand how the MFW
formalities translate to the SPAC setting.252 This analysis will make two
assumptions, that: (1) each SPAC had properly conditioned the Initial
Business Combination ab initio253 on the dual formalities!approval by a
Special Committee and by a vote of majority of the minority
stockholders,254 and (2) each Special Committee was comprised of
directors identified as independent by the SPAC. Therefore, this analysis
will look at the vote totals and perform a Delaware-law-driven, contextspecific determination of director independence to determine whether the
MFW protections would have been met in each instance.
1. Churchill Capital Corp III
In July 2020, Churchill entered into a merger agreement to acquire
MultiPlan, “a leading value-added provider of data analytics and
technology-enabled end-to-end cost management solutions to the U.S.
healthcare industry as measured by revenue and claims.”255 In October
2020, Churchill held a Special Meeting for shareholders to vote upon the
merger.256 At the time of the vote, the Sponsor held 27,500,000 shares of

251. The Delaware “Supreme Court has recognized that the requisite degree of
fiduciary independence may nevertheless be found lacking if the committee and
controller fail, at least, to attempt to ensure that the committee is empowered to negotiate
free of outside influence.” In re CBS Corp. Class Action, 2021 WL 268779, at *39 (citing
Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994)).
252. The de-SPAC transactions proposed by the Sponsors of Churchill Capital Corp
III and GigCapital3, Inc. to their respective shareholders will be analyzed in detail in this
Section.
253. See supra Section III.C.
254. Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014), overruled b!
Flood v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., 195 A.3d 754 (Del. 2018).
255. Churchill Cap. Corp III Proxy Statement, supra note 49, at 4.
256. MultiPlan Corp., Current Report (Form 8!K), at 2 (Oct. 8, 2020).
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investors.258 Of the 137,500,000 shares of common stock entitled to vote,
105,067,599 voted “for,” 7,954,840 “against,” and 22,533 “abstained.” 259
Including the Sponsor-pledged shares, Churchill received a 76.4 percent
vote share approving the merger;260 without the Sponsor pledged shares,
Churchill received a 70.5 percent vote share, satisfying the majority of
minority test.261
As for the potential creation of an independent and adequately
empowered Special Committee, at the time of merger discussions, the
Churchill Board of Directors was comprised of eight directors,262 five of
whom were identified as independent directors.263 Churchill’s proxy
statement notes that the “independent directors evaluated and
unanimously approved, as members of the Churchill Board, the Merger
Agreement and the related agreements and the transactions contemplated
thereby . . . .”264 But each of these five purported independent directors
had ties to the Sponsor, which raise suspicions of independence under
Delaware law.265 To start, each purported independent director held
economic interests in Founder Shares through “ownership of membership
interests in the Sponsor”266 as follows:
258. Id., at 30, F-14 (“Holders of Class A common stock and Class B common stock
will vote together as a single class on all other matters submitted to a vote of stockholders
except as required by law.”).
259. MultiPlan Corp., Current Report (Form 8!K), at 27 (Oct. 8, 2020).
260. Id. 105,067,599 votes “for” divided by the 137,500,000 outstanding shares
equates to 76.4 percent.
261. Id. First subtract the 27,500,000 Sponsor held votes “for” from the total
105,067,599 votes “for,” then divide the result by the 110,000,000 non-Sponsor held
shares to reach 70.5 percent.
262. “The Churchill Board consists of eight members.” Churchill Cap. Corp III Proxy
Statement, supra note 49, at 149.
263. Id. “The Churchill Board has determined that each of Jeremy Paul Abson, Glenn
R. August, Malcolm S. McDermid, Bonnie Jonas and Karen G. Mills is an independent
director under applicable SEC and NYSE rules.”
264. Id. at 110.
265. See supra Section II.B.2.
266. Churchill Cap. Corp III Proxy Statement, supra note 49, at 248. The registration
statement disclosed that:

Glenn R. August, . . . Bonnie Jonas, Karen G. Mills . . . have an
economic interest in shares of Churchill’s common stock through his
or her ownership of membership interests in the Sponsor, but do not
beneficially own any of Churchill’s common stock. In addition,
Jeremy Abson and Steve McDermid may be deemed to have an
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Jeremy Abson
Glenn R. August
Malcom S. McDermid
Karen G. Mills
Bonnie Jonas

294,985
3,933,137
786,672
294,985
294,985

A++"#+a$# Ma",#$
Va-&#268
$3,271,384
$43,618,489
$8,724,192
$3,271,384
$3,271,384

Beyond their Founder Shares, these directors also held economic
interests in the Private Placement Warrants held by the Sponsor.269
Several of these directors simultaneously served or have served on other
boards of SPACs backed by the Sponsor Churchill:
D!"#c$%"270
Jeremy Abson
Glenn R. August
Malcom S. McDermid
Karen G. Mills
Bonnie Jonas

C)&"c)!-- Ca.!$aC%".
No Role
No Role
Former Director
Director
Director

C)&"c)!-- Ca.!$aC%". II
Director
Director
Director
Director
No Role

indirect economic interest in the founder shares and private placement
warrants purchased by the Sponsor as a result of . . . having
membership interests in the Sponsor, and Mr. Abson and Mr.
McDermid’s respective affiliation with such entities.
Id.

267.
268.

Id.
Id. at 30. Aggregate market value determined by converting founder shares onefor-one to common stock “based upon the closing price of $11.09 per share on the NYSE
on September 14, 2020, the record date for the special meeting.” Id.
269. Plaintiffs’ Omnibus Answering Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss, at 41, In re MultiPlan Corp. S’holders Litigation, No. 2021-0300-LWW (Del.
Ch. Apr. 9, 2021) (noting “the Directors had economic interests in the Sponsor’s $23
million in Private Placement Warrants.”) (citing Churchill Capital Corp III, Current
Report (Form 8!K), at 2 (Feb. 19, 2020) (Ex. D)).
269. Churchill Cap. Corp III Proxy Statement, supra note 49, at 147-49.
270. Id.
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To echo the plaintiffs in the ongoing MultiPlan litigation, even
“[p]utting aside their personal profit motive in this Merger, none of the
directors can qualify as independent from the” Sponsor.271 Serving as a
director for Churchill “was not a one-time multi-million-dollar payday for
these directors.”272 Instead, it was but one of several opportunities
afforded to these directors by the Sponsor. Participating in#or having the
prospect to participate in#a series of multi-million dollar directorship
opportunities likely presents sufficiently “deep business and personal ties
. . . [to] raise a reasonable doubt” over the directors’ independence.273
Beyond the business ties, which likely imperil the directors’
independence, the structure of the directors’ responsibilities raises further
questions.274 Prior to consummating the Initial Business Combination,
only the Sponsor could elect or remove the Churchill directors.275 And at
the outset of the SPAC, the “directors have agreed (and their permitted
transferees will agree) to vote any Founder Shares and any public shares
held by them in favor of [the] initial business combination.”276 Further,
the directors could be removed at any point by the Sponsor, and pledged
271. Plaintiffs’ Omnibus Answering Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss, at 38, In re MultiPlan Corp., No. 2021-0300-LWW (“Putting aside their
personal profit motive in this Merger, none of the directors can qualify as independent
from the [Sponsor] and none are entitled to dismissal.”). For the plaintiffs’ full arguments
regarding why the director defendants do not qualify as independent, see id. at 38-42.
272. Id. at 38-39.
273. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 808-09 (Del. 2019).
274. Plaintiffs’ Omnibus Answering Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss at 39, In re MultiPlan Corp., No. 2021-0300-LWW (arguing that the Sponsor
“structured the Founder Shares to give him the unilateral and exclusive power to elect
and remove any directors at any time”).
275. Churchill Capital Corp III, Amendment No. 3 to Registration Statement (Form
S!1/A), at 13 (Feb. 13, 2020) (“Prior to the consummation of our initial business
combination, only holders of [Founder Shares] will have the right to vote on the election
of directors.”). Churchill Cap. Corp III Registration Statement, supra note 30, at 13.
Further:

[A]ny or all of the directors may be removed from office at any time,
but only for cause and only by the affirmative vote of holders of a
majority of the voting power of all then outstanding shares of our
capital stock entitled to vote generally in the election of directors,
voting together as a single class.
Id. at 138.
276. Id. at 34.
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the outset of the SPAC, the “directors have agreed (and their permitted
transferees will agree) to vote any Founder Shares and any public shares
held by them in favor of [the] initial business combination.”276 Further,
the directors could be removed at any point by the Sponsor, and pledged
to vote for the Initial Business Combination from the get-go, so their level
of independence is questionable at best. Had these directors
independently identified the target company, led the due diligence, and
conducted the negotiations, an inference of independence could be found.
But instead, it was the Sponsor who led the entire process.277 All things
considered, the specifics here likely present a “constellation of facts that,
taken together, create a reasonable doubt about [the director]’s ability to
objectively” exercise her discretion as a director.278
2. GigCapital3, Inc.
In December 2020, GigCapital3, Inc. (“GigCapital3”) entered into a
merger agreement with Lightning Systems,279 “a leading electric vehicle
designer and manufacturer, providing complete electrification solutions
for commercial fleets.”280 GigCapital3 held a special meeting of
shareholders in April 2021 to vote on the Initial Business Combination.281
All of the common stock entitled to vote was counted as a single class, 282
Id. at 34.
Churchill Cap. Corp III Proxy Statement, supra note 49, at 102-07 (documenting
the involvement of the Sponsor at each step of the transaction, from sourcing through
approval of the final Merger Agreement).
278. In re BGC Partners, Inc., 2019 WL 4745121, at *9 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2019)
(quoting In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 2018 WL 1381331, at *18 (Del. Ch. Mar.
19, 2018); Gail Weinstein, Brian T. Mangino & Andrew J. Colosimo, Conflicted
Controllers, the #800-Pound Gorillas$: Part II(BGC, HARV. L. LAW SCHOOL F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 7, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/11/07/
conflicted-controllers-the-800-pound-gorillas-part-ii-bgc/ [https://perma.cc/W7Y6-LZ
HX] (“BGC underscores that the evaluation must be based on "the constellation of facts,’
considered in totality,’ relating to the director’s business and personal relationships with
the controller or other interested party.”).
279. Proxy Statement for Special Meeting of GigCapital3, Inc. (Rule 424(b)(3)), at
31 (Mar. 26, 2021) [hereinafter GigCapital3, Inc. Special Meeting Proxy Statement].
280. Id. at 259.
281. GigCapital3, Inc., Current Report (Form 8!K), at Item 5.07 (Apr. 22, 2021).
282. GigCapital3, Inc. Special Meeting Proxy Statement, supra note 279, at 126
(“[C]onsummat[ing] the Business Combination only if it is approved by the affirmative
vote (online or by proxy) of the holders of a majority of the outstanding shares of our
Common Stock entitled to vote and actually cast thereon online at the Special Meeting,
voting as a single class.”).
276.
277.
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to vote.284 With the Sponsor and the directors having pledged their
Founder Shares from the outset to approve the transaction,285 56.2 percent
of the outstanding common stock voted to approve the transaction.286
Without counting the pre-pledged Sponsor- and director-held shares, only
43.3 percent of the other outstanding common stockholders approved the
transaction, falling short of the majority of the minority standard.287 As a
result, this de-SPAC transaction would not have been afforded business
judgment review.
Even if this vote had satisfied the majority of the minority standard,
it is unlikely that an independent and adequately empowered Special
Committee could have been created for the similar reasons discussed in
Churchill’s proposed acquisition of MultiPlan: the directors’ business ties
to the Sponsor and the structural limitations of their directorship raise
reasonable doubt concerning their ability to exercise independent
judgment.288 At the time of merger discussions, the GigCapital3 board of
directors consisted of six directors,289 with four directors identified as
independent under the listing requirements.290 “Directors are "selfinterested’ when they appear on "both sides of a transaction’ or expect to
"derive any [material] personal financial benefit from it in the sense of
self-dealing.’”291 Each of the four purportedly independent directors held
284. Id. at 37 (“On the record date, there were 25,893,479 shares of Common Stock
outstanding and entitled to vote, of which 20,000,000 are public shares and 5,893,479 are
Initial Stockholder Shares and Insider Shares held by [the] Initial Stockholders.”).
285. Id. at 20 (disclosing that prior to the IPO, the company “entered into agreements
with [its] Initial Stockholders and each of [its] directors and officers, pursuant to which
each agreed to vote any shares of Common Stock owned by them in favor of the Business
Combination Proposal”).
286. Out of the 25,893,479 shares of common stock outstanding and entitled to vote,
14,555,716 shares voted “for,” 256,855 shares voted “against,” and 17,017 shares
abstained. GigCapital3, Inc., Current Report (Form 8!K), at Item 5.07 (Apr. 22, 2021).
14,555,716 votes “for” divided by the 25,893,479 shares outstanding equates to 56.2
percent.
287. First subtract the 5,893,479 Sponsor held votes “for” from the total 14,555,716
votes “for,” then divide the result by the 20,000,000 non-Sponsor held shares to reach
43.3 percent. GigCapital3, Inc. Special Meeting Proxy Statement, supra note 279, at 37;
GigCapital3, Inc., Current Report (Form 8!K), at Item 5.07 (Apr. 22, 2021).
288. See supra Section III.D.1.
289. GigCapital3, Inc. Special Meeting Proxy Statement, supra note 279, at 214-18.
290. Id. at 218 (“Messrs. Miotto, Mikulsky, Wang and Betti-Berutto are the
Company’s independent directors.”).
291. Calesa Associates, L.P. v. Am. Capital, Ltd., 2016 WL 770251, at *11 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 29, 2016) (citing Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 23 (Del. Ch. 2002)).
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economic interests in the SPAC Sponsor;292 and two directors were
granted an additional 5,000 insider shares “in consideration of future
services.”293 According to the proxy materials, the Sponsor shares and
warrants were worth $63.1 million294 and $8.8 million,295 respectively,
heading into the special meeting, while the additional insider shares held
by the two directors were worth $55,950.296 While the economic interests
at stake in this transaction are noticeably smaller than what the directors
of Churchill held,297 these interests are still sizeable and are still materially
greater than $0. If no transaction is consummated, these Sponsor interests
expire worthless and the common stock will be redeemed near par.298 As
the plaintiffs in the pending litigation allege, these directors “were self292. GigCapital3, Inc., Amendment No. 4 to Registration Statement (Form S!1/A),
at 75 (Apr. 29, 2020) (“[T]he manager of [the] Sponsor, and Mr. Miotto, one of [the]
independent directors, have formed an LLC named GigFounders, LLC, of which 90
[percent] is owned by Drs. Katz and Dinu, who are husband and wife, and 10 [percent]
is owned by Mr. Miotto . . . .”).

Messrs. Mikulsky, Wang and Betti-Berutto, . . . each have a financial
and voting interest in [the] Sponsor that entitles each of them to
participate in any economic return that the Sponsor receives for its
investment in the Company in accordance with terms negotiated with
the other holders of financial and voting interests in [the] Sponsor.
Id.

293. The Company “issue[d] 5,000 insider shares to each of Messrs. Betti-Berutto and
Wang in consideration of future services to [it] as the Hardware Chief Technical Officer
and Software Chief Technical Officer, respectively.” Id. at 48.
294. GigCapital3, Inc. Special Meeting Proxy Statement, supra note 279, at 5 (“The
5,635,000 Initial Stockholder Shares owned by the Sponsor would have had an aggregate
market value of $63.1 million based upon the closing price of $11.19 per public share on
the NYSE on March 19, 2021, the most recent practicable date prior to the date of this
proxy statement/prospectus.”).
295. Id. at 5 (“The 650,000 private placement units held by the Sponsor would have
had an aggregate market value of $8.8 million based upon the closing price of $13.59 per
public unit on the NYSE on March 19, 2021, the most recent practicable date prior to the
date of this proxy statement/prospectus.”).
296. Determined by multiplying the 5,000 insider shares by “the closing price of
$11.19 per public share on the NYSE on March 19, 2021.” Id.
297. See supra Section III.D.1.
298. GigCapital3, Inc. Special Meeting Proxy Statement, supra note 279, at 81 (“If
[the SPAC is] unable to complete an initial business combination by the applicable
deadline, [the] public stockholders may receive only approximately $10.00 per share.”);
Id. at 90 (“The Initial Stockholder Shares will be worthless if we do not complete a
business combination by the applicable deadline.”).
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interested in effectuating the Merger because they each stood to receive
proceeds from their interest in the Sponsor’s Initial Stockholder Shares
(and, in the case of [the two aforementioned directors], their own Initial
Stockholder Shares), which would not have been available had the Merger
been rejected.”299 As a result, these directors were not truly free to
exercise independent judgment in evaluating the transaction.
Beyond the financial incentives directly at play in this transaction,
the directors were similarly faced with opportunities to participate in other
lucrative directorship opportunities under this Sponsor.300 Each of the four
purportedly independent directors had professional relationships with the
two previous SPACs led by the Sponsor:
D!"#c$%"301
Neil Miotto
John Mikulsky
Andrea BettiBerutto
Peter Wang

G!+Ca.!$a-, I'c.
(GIG1)
Director
Director
No Role
Former Director

G!+Ca.!$a-2, I'c.
(GIG2)
Director
Director
Hardware Chief Technical
Officer
Software Chief Technical
Officer

Directorship in GigCapital3 was “not a one-time payday for these
directors.”302 The directors enjoy “substantial roles in GigCapital, the
umbrella organization for [the Sponsor]’s many Gig entities.”303 As the
plaintiffs allege, the Sponsor “ensured the loyalty of each Director by
giving them multiple value-creating opportunities.”304 Such “deep
business and personal ties . . . raise a reasonable doubt” over a director’s
independence.305

299. Delman v. GigAcquisitions3, LLC, Plaintiff’s Answering Brief in Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, at 32-33, Docket No. 2021-0679 (Del. Ch. Aug. 4, 2021).
300. GigCapital3, Inc. Special Meeting Proxy Statement, supra note 279, at 215-17.
301. Id. (detailing the previous work experiences and credentials of each director);
See GigCapital3, Inc. Registration Statement, supra note 29, at 3, 96-99 (disclosing the
previous SPACs and describing the directors’ relationship with each).
302. Delman v. GigAcquisitions3, LLC, Plaintiff’s Answering Brief in Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, 36, Docket No. 2021-0679 (Del. Ch. Aug. 4, 2021).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 808 (Del. 2019).
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Realistically, it is again unclear how much independence these
directors could actually exercise based upon the terms of their
directorships. Directors “lack independence where they were "beholden’
to . . . or so under [the controller’s] influence that their discretion would
be sterilized.’”306 At the outset, the directors pledged to vote for the Initial
Business Combination irrespective of how the non-Sponsor held common
stock votes.307 The Sponsor planned to “exert control at least until the
completion of [the] business combination.”308 The independent directors
are granted some specific powers, notably “to review on a quarterly basis
all payments that were made to [the] Sponsor, executive officers or
[respective] affiliates.”309 But their participation and approval is not
generally needed in the one action the SPAC will take: selecting a merger
partner.310 Without providing the directors enumerated responsibilities in
the process, or at least a role in the negotiation and approval of the merger
agreement, the directors cede their responsibilities to the Sponsorcontroller. It is apparent that, by looking at the provided background of
306. Calesa Associates, L.P. v. Am. Capital, Ltd., 2016 WL 770251, at *11 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 29, 2016) (citing Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 24 (Del. Ch. 2002)); In re BGC
Partners, Inc. Derivative Litig., 2021 WL 4271788, at *6 (Del. Ch. Sept. 20, 2021)
(quoting Del. Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund v. Sanchez, 124 A.3d 1017, 1023 n.25 (Del. 2015))
(“A director "subject to the interested party’s dominion or beholden to that interested
party’ lacks independence.”).
307. See GigCapital3, Inc. Registration Statement, supra note 29, at 32 (“[The] initial
stockholders have agreed to vote in favor of such initial business combination, regardless
of how our public stockholders vote.”).
308. Effectively, the Sponsor would remain in control irrespective of the
circumstances before the Initial Business Combination:

[Without an annual meeting,] all of the current directors will continue
in office until at least the completion of the business combination. If
there is an annual meeting, the entire Board of Directors will be
considered for election, however [the] initial stockholders, because of
their ownership position, will have considerable influence regarding
the outcome. Accordingly, [the] initial stockholders will continue to
exert control at least until the completion of our business combination.
Id. at 56.
309. Id. at 117.
310. “[A]pproval of a majority of [the] disinterested independent directors” is
however needed should the SPAC elect to pursue “an initial business combination with
an entity that is affiliated with any of [the] Sponsor, officers or directors” to ensure “that
the business combination is fair to [the] unaffiliated stockholders from a financial point
of view.” Id. at 118.

616

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXVII

the business combination, that is exactly what happened: the Sponsorcontroller and his wife, a listed non-independent director, led the target
selection process, from sourcing to negotiating the merger agreement. 311
With little, if any, involvement in the Initial Business Combination
process, the purportedly “independent” directors in GigCapital3 were
certainly not independent under Delaware law, thereby this transaction
would fail under the second prong of the MFW analysis.
CONCLUSION
Determining whether the de-SPAC transaction merits business
judgment deference or entire fairness review is a matter of first impression
for Delaware courts but will soon be resolved as several cases sit before
the Court of Chancery.312 While some elements of the de-SPAC
transaction resemble a traditional corporate merger,313 other aspects are
unique and present new challenges for the court to consider.314 But
Delaware courts are well equipped for this inquiry, as “[i]t is the very
nature of equity to look beyond form to the substance of an
arrangement.”315 For the de-SPAC transaction, the “difference in form,
which is a product of transactional creativity, should not affect how the
law views the substance of what truly occurred.”316
Looking to the facts of the specific transaction at issue, Delaware
courts can determine whether business judgment deference or entire
fairness is the appropriate standard of review.317 An examination of the
SPAC Sponsor’s role throughout the SPAC lifecycle reveals that the
Sponsor exerts a sufficient level of control to be considered a controlling
311. GigCapital3, Inc. Special Meeting Proxy Statement, supra note 279, 147-57
(Mar. 26, 2021) (detailing the background of the transaction; the independent directors
infrequently appear in the step-by-step details).
312. In re MultiPlan Corp. S’holders Litigation, Docket No. 2021-0300 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 09, 2021); Delman v. GigAcquisitions3, LLC, Docket No. 2021-0679 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 04, 2021); In re XL Fleet (Pivotal) S’holder Litig., Docket No. 2021-0808 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 20, 2021).
313. See supra Section I.C.
314. See id.
315. See Gatz v. Ponsoldt, 925 A.2d 1265, 1280 (Del. 2007). See also EDIX Media
Grp., Inc. v. Mahani, 2006 WL 3742595, at *9 n.40 (Del. Ch. Dec. 12, 2006) (“Whatever
the industry terminology, however, this Court looks to the substance of the transaction,
not its label.”).
316. Gat& 925 A.2d at 1280.
317. See supra Part II.
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shareholder.318 Looking at the terms of the de-SPAC transaction,
Sponsors receive unique benefits 319 that are not ratably320 shared with the
non-Sponsor holders of common stock: although the holders of common
stock appear to participate in the transaction on the same terms, the
conversion of Founder Shares to common stock and opportunities to
participate in private placements are not available to the non-Sponsor
common stockholders.321 Alternative arguments further support the entire
fairness standard.322 The SPAC directors are interested323 in the
transaction through their ownership of Founder Shares, and multiple
directorships in other Sponsor-backed SPACs present sufficiently deep
business ties between the directors and the Sponsor to create a reasonable
doubt of independence.324 Between the existence of a conflicted controller
transaction and of interested directors who additionally lack
independence, Delaware courts should find that entire fairness is the
proper standard of review.325
To earn business judgment deference, SPACs should look to the dual
formalities of MFW, which have been used in a variety of situations to
secure business judgment review where entire fairness would otherwise
be the operative standard.326 Conflicted controller transactions require
additional protections to secure business judgment deference,327 and the
MFW formalities provide a roadmap for SPACs to follow.328 These
formalities could easily be applied to the de-SPAC process and only a few
small changes are required before they are met.329 Using the two leading
SPAC litigations as case studies in applying the MFW framework, it is
clear that further changes are required before SPACs can secure business
judgment review.330 Once SPACs restructure directorship terms to
remove interest in transactions and limit board participation, SPACs can
See supra Section III.A.
See supra Section III.B. In re Crimson Expl. Inc. S’holder Litig., 2014 WL
5449419, at *12 (Del. Ch. Oct. 24, 2014).
320. See supra Section III.B. In re CBS Corp. S’holder Class Action & Derivative
Litig., 2021 WL 268779, at *36 (Del. Ch. Jan. 27, 2021), as corrected (Feb. 4, 2021).
321. See supra Sections III.B.1 and III.B.2.
322. See supra Sections III.C.1 and III.C.2.
323. See supra Section III.C.1.
324. See supra Section III.C.2.
325. See supra Part III.
326. See supra Part IV.
327. See supra Section IV.A.
328. See supra Section IV.B.
329. See supra Section IV.C.
330. See supra Section IV.C.
318.
319.
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earn business judgment deference by following the proposed MFW
framework.

